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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DIG: AN EMPIRICAL
AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE* & RAFAEL GELY**
I. INTRODUCTION
Almost all cases reach the docket of the United States Supreme
Court through the discretionary writ of certiorari.' In the normal course
of events, the vast majority of petitions for a writ are denied.2 For those
few petitions that are granted, the case is then briefed, orally argued,
and decided on the merits. However, in a small number of cases the
normal course is diverted, and the Court changes its mind by
dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. 3 This action
is usually referred to by the pithy acronym "DIG," a convention we
will use as well.4 Few cases are DIGged. In the past fifty years, the
Court has on average only DIGged about two or three cases per Term.'
Given the paucity of numbers, why should anyone other than the
cognoscenti of Court practice be interested in the DIG?
There are several reasons why the DIG is of interest. First,
virtually by definition, any case in which certiorari is granted is an
* Donald P. Klekamp Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of
Law. J.D. 1981, Northwestern University.
** Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. Ph.D. (Labor
and Industrial Relations) 1992 and J.D. 1987, University of Illinois.
We are greatly appreciative of the excellent work of our research assistants, Christy
Hanley and Matt Kitchen, and of the helpful comments of Larry Baum, Scott
Hendrickson, Hal Krent, Adam Steinman, and James Walker on an earlier draft. We
both thank the Harold C. Schott Foundation for its financial support.
1. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2000) (providing for appeals to the Supreme Court
from the United States Courts of Appeals); 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000) (providing for
appeals to the Supreme Court from state supreme courts). A small number of cases
reach the Court by mandatory appeals, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2000) (regarding
appeals from three-judge district courts), or are part of the Court's original jurisdiction,
see 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000).
2. H. W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 39, 106 (1991).
3. Id. at 106.
4. See Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the
Supreme Court, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1067, 1074 n. 18 (1988) (referring to the colloquial
use of the term "DIG"). According to H.W. Perry, who interviewed Justices and their
clerks, the term is used at the Court itself, though the past tense used there is "digged,"
not "dug." PERRY, supra note 2, at 39, 106.
5. See infra Part II, for a further discussion of the statistics.
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important case to the legal- community in some way. Declining to
review a case, where the initial decision was to do so, is bound to make
waves. Consider the recent example of Nike, Inc. v. Kgasky.6 In that
case, a consumer activist in California sued a prominent manufacturer
of athletic gear for alleged misrepresentations the company had made
regarding the working conditions in its overseas production plants.' The
plaintiff relied on California unfair competition and false advertising
statutes that also created a private cause of action to enforce the laws.8
The provisions permitted the plaintiff to sue as a private attorney
general. 9 The California Supreme Court permitted the suit to go
forward in the face of a First Amendment defense.' After certiorari
was granted, it was much anticipated that Nike, however it came out,
would be an important addition to the Court's commercial speech
doctrine; 1 after oral argument, however, the Court DIGged the case.1 2
As an institution, the Court did so in a per curiam order with no further
comment.' 3 In a concurring opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens
explained why a DIG was appropriate, despite what he acknowledged
to be the "novel" and "difficult" First Amendment issues involved.' 4 In
his judgment, a DIG was appropriate given that the California courts
had not entered a final appealable order; the parties did not have
standing to raise the federal issues; and resolution of the constitutional
issues would be better served by a full factual record, as opposed to a
disposition on the pleadings alone, as had occurred in the case.' 5 Justice
Breyer, dissenting from the DIG decision, contested those points,16 and
argued that the "importance of the First Amendment concerns at stake"
counseled in favor of reaching the merits of the case.' 7 The Justices
who spoke in Nike seemed to assume that the case would eventually
6. 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (per curiam).
7. Id. at 656.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 661.
10. Id. at 657.
11. For a general discussion, see Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys
General and the First Amendment, 103 MICH. L. REv. 589, 592-93 (2005).
12. Nike, 539 U.S. at 655.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 663 (Stevens, J., concurring, joined by Ginsburg, J., and Souter, J.,
concurring in part) (noting that the difficulty and novelty of the legal issues in fact
provided a "good reason" for DIGging the case).
15. Id at 658-64.
16. Id. at 667-84 (Breyer, J., joined by O'Connor, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 684. Justice Kennedy also dissented from the DIG, but gave no
reasons. Id. at 665 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
1422
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return to the docket.' 8 The same or similar issue may come back to the
Court, but it will have to come through another controversy, as the
parties in Nike settled their suit. 9 Although observers expect that the
issues raised in Nike are bound to return to the Court "in some future
case,"" ° the use of the DIG delayed their authoritative resolution, at
least for a few years.
A second, related reason why the DIG is worthy of attention
concerns the Court's most limited resource, its case docket. For most
of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court was deciding well over
one-hundred cases on the merits each Term."' As late as the late 1980s,
the Court was deciding, on average, 140 cases each Term. 2 But the
numbers inexorably declined starting in the early 1990s, as the Court
began accepting fewer cases for review. 3 The Court now routinely
18. See id. at 663 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring) (asserting that the issues raised
"would benefit from further development below"); id. at 667 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(stating that the "delay" caused by the DIG will not make "the issue significantly easier
to decide later on"). An even more dramatic example of the Court anticipating that an
issue in a DIGged case would likely return to the Court occurred last Term in Medellin
v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (2005) (per curiam). The issues presented in Medellin were
whether a federal court in a habeas corpus case is bound by a ruling of the International
Court of Justice ("ICJ") on whether there was a procedural default, and, if not,
whether as a matter of comity the court should give effect to the ICJ's judgment. Id. at
2089. All of the opinions in the case observed that the case could potentially return to
the Court's docket after further proceedings in state court. Id. at 2090 n.1, 2092
(majority opinion); id. at 2095 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 2096 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); id. at 2106 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 2107-08 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Like Nike, the disposition in Medellin did not lack for attention. See Linda
Greenhouse, Justices Drop Capital Case Ruled on by World Court, N.Y. TIMES, May
24, 2005, at A17; Charles Lane, High Court Rejects Case of Mexican Death Row
Inmate, WASH. POST, May 24, 2005, at A6. The Justices' suspicion that the issue
raised by Medellin would return to the Court in the near future was proven right, as the
Court recently granted certiorari in two cases, Bustillo v. Johnson, 126 S. Ct. 621
(2005); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 620 (2005), raising essentially the very
same issue as in Medellin. See Linda Greenhouse, Two Convicts from Abroad Win
Hearings by Justices, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2005, at A22.
19. Nike Settles Suit by California Activist over Statements on Working
Conditions, 72 U.S.L.W. (BNA) 2160, 2160 (2003). Moreover, the California statutes
at issue in Nike-providing for private attorney general actions-were modified by the
California voters by the passage of Proposition 64 in the fall 2004 elections. Voters in
Florida, Nevada Limit Fee Awards, California Voters Curb Private AG Actions, 73
U.S.L.W. (BNA) 2291, 2291-92 (2004); Morrison, supra note 11, at 638-39.
20. Morrison, supra note 11, at 637.
21. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA,
DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 75-76 tbl.2-8 (3d ed. 2003) (compiling data from the
1926 through 2001 Terms).
22. Id. at 76 tbl.2-8.
23. Id.
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decides only about eighty cases on the merits each Term. 4 Thus, the
impact of one or two DIGged cases each recent Term is not trivial, if it
ever was.
25
Finally, a set of intellectually challenging and practically important
issues are raised by the Court's exercise of the DIG. Most notably, the
Court has long used a "Rule of Four" to determine the minimum
number of Justices needed to agree that a writ of certiorari should be
granted. 26 How many votes are needed to DIG a case? If it is only five,
then the Rule of Four could be undermined by the majority. If it is six
or more, then this supermajority rule pays more deference to the Rule
of Four by requiring at least one of the four Justices to have changed
his or her mind on the propriety of reviewing the case. Then, too, are
the jurisprudential questions of what reasons ought to justify a DIG-
24. See The Supreme Court, 2004 Tenm; The Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV.
415, 425 tbl.2 (2005) (reporting that the Court decided eighty-three cases on the merits
for the 2004 Term); The Supreme Court, 2003 Term; The Statistics, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 497, 506 tbl.2 (2004) (reporting that the Court decided seventy-eight cases on the
merits for the 2003 Term); The Supreme Court, 2002 Term; The Statistics, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 480, 488 tbl.2 (2003) (reporting the same for the 2002 Term). There has been
considerable discussion of the reasons for the decline in the Court's plenary docket.
Among the reasons advanced are the almost total elimination of the Court's mandatory
appellate jurisdiction (by legislation in 1988), change in Court personnel and the desire
of at least some Justices to lessen the role of the Court in American life, changes in the
ideological makeup of the lower federal courts and related changes in the percentage of
cases the Court might be more inclined to reverse, and less frequent appeals by the
federal government. For a fuller discussion of these and other reasons, see generally
Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari:
Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L. Q.
389 (2004) [hereinafter Cordray & Cordray, Philosophy of Certiorari]; Margaret
Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court's Plenary Docket, 58
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737 (2001); Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE
L.J. 511, 557-59 (1998) (book review); Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of
the Rehnquist Court, 1996 Sup. CT. REV. 403; Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the
Second Rehnquist Court. A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 569, 640-44(2003); Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term, Foreword: A Political
Court, 119 HAav. L. REV. 31 (2005); David M. O'Brien, A Diminished Plenary
Docket: A Legacy of the Rehnquist Court, 89 JUDICATURE 134 (2005).
25. The impact of the DIGged cases is likely to be substantially larger for two
reasons. First, as our study demonstrates, see infra Part II.C. 1, ninety-two percent of
the cases are DIGged by the Court after oral argument has taken place. Although this
might be unavoidable (that is, the Justices might not be able to realize the necessity to
dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted until after oral arguments have
taken place), such an occurrence consumes time and effort and limits the ability of the
Court to hear and decide other cases. Second, as we discuss below, see infra notes 62-
63 and accompanying text, when we compare the cases that the Court DIGged to the
cases that the Court appeared to have considered DIGging, the total number of cases is
higher, suggesting that the decision to DIG a case is a significant question.
26. Joan Maisel Leiman, The Rule of Four, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 975
(1957).
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should it be enough that a majority (or supermajority) of the Justices
simply think that the original grant of certiorari was wrong? Or should
additional or different reasons be necessary, such as circumstances
being changed since certiorari was granted? Relatedly, should the Court
as an institution, or the Justices individually, always issue opinions
explaining their decision to DIG a case?27
In this Article, we explore the Supreme Court's use of the DIG
from both empirical and institutional perspectives.28 There has been
relatively little empirical analysis of the Court's use of the DIG in the
scholarly literature.29 We begin to fill that gap in Part II. That Part first
provides an overview of the Court's certiorari process, specifically the
Rule of Four, and the DIG. We then present data we collected on the
Court's use of the DIG over the last half-century, from the beginning of
the Warren Court in 1954 to the Court's most recent 2004 Term. We
examine, among other things, how often the Court DIGs cases and the
types of cases typically DIGged.
Part III of the Article addresses a number of institutional and
jurisprudential issues raised by the Court's use of the DIG. In contrast
to the empirical issues, there is a substantial scholarly literature on this
front,3" but we reexamine the principal issues, informed in part by the
empirical analysis in Part II. Specifically, we consider the interrelated
issues of whether a majority or supermajority vote should be necessary
27. For further discussion of these issues, see infra Part III.
28. We join a burgeoning literature that examines, from various perspectives,
heretofore underappreciated aspects of the Court's procedure and practice. See, e.g.,
Edward A. Harmett, Ties in the Supreme Court of the United States, 44 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 643 (2002) (discussing 4-4 decisions); Valerie Hoekstra & Timothy Johnson,
Delaying Justice: The Supreme Court's Decision to Hear Rearguments, 56 POL. RES.
Q. 351 (2003) (discussing reargued cases in the Supreme Court); Shaun P. Martin,
Gaming the GVR, 36 ARIz. ST. L.J. 551 (2004) (discussing cases where the Court
grants certiorari, vacates the decision below, and remands for further proceedings);
Harold J. Spaeth, Relisting: An Unexamined Feature of Supreme Court Decision
Making, 25 JUST. SYS. J. 143 (2004) (discussing cases where a Justice requested that
consideration of a certiorari petition be put over to another conference).
29. The important exception is Scott A. Hendrickson, To DIG or Not to DIG:
Using DIGs to Examine Supreme Court Decision Making and Agenda Setting
(unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Am. Pol. Sci. Ass'n, Aug.
27-31, 2003) (examining the Supreme Court's use of the DIG during the Burger Court
era, 1969-1986) (on file with authors), available at http://www.artsci.
wustl.edu/ - sahendri/workingpaper/apsa03.pdf.
30. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1603-11 (5th ed. 2003); PERRY, supra note
2, at 106-12; ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 328-32 (8th ed.
2002); James F. Blumstein, The Supreme Court's Jurisdiction-Reform Proposals,
Discretionary Review, and Writ Dismissals, 26 VAND. L. REv. 895, 917-37 (1973);
Revesz & Karlan, supra note 4, at 1082-95; Adrian Vermeule, Submajority Rules:
Forcing Accountability upon Majorities, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 74 (2005).
14252005:1421
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to DIG a case; whether and how the Court should give reasons every
time it DIGs a case; what constitutes principled reasons to DIG a case;
and whether the DIG practice can or should be regarded as an instance
of strategic behavior on the part of the Justices. We conclude the
Article in Part IV and suggest avenues of further research and analysis.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S USE OF THE DIG, 1954-2005: AN
EMPIRICAL OVERVIEW
A. Background
The writ of certiorari process in the Supreme Court, and its use of
the Rule of Four and the DIG, are relatively esoteric, but the general
outlines are familiar enough that an extended discussion is not
necessary. The Rule of Four-that only the votes of four of nine
Justices is necessary to grant a petition for certiorari-is probably
familiar to most of the legal community, but the origins and application
of the Rule have been aptly described by Justice Stevens as "somewhat
obscure." 31 The Rule has apparently been used by the Court since at
least the early part of the last century.32 It first received public notice in
the hearings that preceded the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1925, 33
also known as the Judges' Bill,34 which statutorily established the
discretionary system of review embodied in the writ of certiorari.35
Testimony from the Justices at those hearings suggested that the
submajority Rule was an avenue to ensure that important cases would
indeed be reviewed by the full Court, and would prevent arbitrary
denials of review.36
31. John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1, 10 (1983) (footnote omitted).
32. See Leiman, supra note 26, at 981.
33. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1296 (2000)).
34. This is because "it was drafted by a committee of Supreme Court
Justices." Stevens, supra note 31, at 10 n.49.
35. For a description and discussion of those hearings and the related
legislative history, see Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari. Some Reflections
Seventy-Five Years after the Judges' Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1643, 1674-1704
(2000); Leiman, supra note 26, at 978-88; Revesz & Karlan, supra note 4, at 1068-72.
36. Leiman, supra note 26, at 986-87; Revesz & Karlan, supra note 4, at
1068-70. As Vermeule points out, these rationales are at best "underdeveloped."
Vermeule, supra note 30, at 81. At the hearings the Justices meant to assuage concerns
that certiorari would lead to too few cases being decided on the merits. Stevens, supra
note 31, at 14. Yet in 1925, much less now, there is little consensus on the optimal
number of cases the Court should be deciding each Term. Similarly, the Court has
1426
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The Court's use of the DIG apparently has a pedigree as long as
that of the Rule of Four. In the same hearings on the Judges' Bill,
Justice Willis Van Devanter, while describing the certiorari process,
stated that under certain circumstances (for example, when facts that
came to light after certiorari was granted), the Court had "'dismissed
the petition as ... improvidently granted.' '" 7 Later on, in a published
opinion DIGging a case in 1955, the Court stated that up to that point it
had DIGged "more than sixty" cases, and cited the cases, with the
earliest being in 1911.38 Typically, the Court decides to DIG a case
never been clear on the criteria it employs in deciding whether to grant certiorari, aside
from the generalities found in its rules. See Sup. CT. R. 10 (providing as relevant
factors in certiorari the presence of a split on an issue in the lower courts and the
"importance" of the federal issue presented).
37. Blumstein, supra note 30, at 924 (quoting Procedure in Federal Courts-
Hearings on S. 2060 and S. 2061 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 31
(1924) (statement of Willis Van Devanter, J.)) (omission in original).
38. Rice v. Sioux City Mem'l Park Cemetery, Inc., 349 U.S. 70, 78 & n.2
(1955). The Court cited cases spanning a long period of time, including United States
v. Rimer, 220 U.S. 547 (1911) through California ex rel. Brown v. St. Louis Union
Trust Co., 348 U.S. 932 (1955). Id. It is not clear, though, that all of these case are
DIGs in the classic sense of the term. For example, the Rimer case can be read for the
proposition that certiorari was dismissed because the Court felt that the procedural
posture of the case (as revealed at oral argument) made it not "within the scope of the
grant of power to review by certiorari." Rimer, 220 U.S. at 548. The Court dismissed
the writ of certiorari without using the word "improvidently." See id. Later cases make
a distinction between those that are DIGged and those where certiorari is dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction, see infra Part III.C., and Rimer might be read to fall into the latter
group. On the other hand, cases other than Rice cite Rimer as an example of a DIG,
including the first case that apparently used the language that now constitutes the DIG
acronym. Furness, Withy & Co. v. Yang-Tsze Ins. Ass'n, 242 U.S. 430, 431 (1917).
The reader might wonder why the Court in Rice was moved to cite the large number of
cases. One reason might be the apparently controversial nature of the disposition of the
Rice case, which we discuss infra Part III.D., and the Court may have wished to
emphasize the legitimacy of DIGging a case. Another reason might be that Justice Felix
Frankfurter authored the majority opinion in Rice, and he was not hesitant to comment
on the administration of the Court's business, either from a scholarly perspective, see
FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1927), or in internal discussions with the
other Justices, see Dennis J. Hutchinson, Felix Frankfurter and the Business of the
Supreme Court, 0. T. 1946-0. T. 1961, 1980 Sup. CT. REv. 143. In his book,
Frankfurter commented approvingly, albeit briefly, on what we now call the DIG. See
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra, at 287 ("[B]ecause of the quantity of these petitions
[for certiorari] and the conditions under which they must be scrutinized, they are
sometimes granted when they should have been denied." (footnote omitted) (citing,
among other cases, Rimer, 220 U.S. 547 and Furness, 242 U.S. 430)); see also infra
Part III.A-B (discussing Frankfurter's views of the votes and reasons necessary for a
DIG).
HeinOnline  -- 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 1427 2005
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
after briefing and oral argument have taken place.39 Presumably, this is
because the briefs and subsequent oral argument can bring new facts or
other issues about the case to the Court's attention in a way not
apparent from the papers before the Justices at the certiorari stage.'
Sometimes the Court explains in an opinion (often a relatively short,
per curiam disposition, or in a concurring opinion, as in Nke)41 why a
case is being DIGged. In those instances, the reasons advanced are
often that the case does not squarely present the issue the Court thought
it did when certiorari was granted, or that changed circumstances
suggest that the case is no longer an appropriate one on which to rule.42
As we mentioned in the Introduction, a particularly charged issue has
been the voting protocols on DIGging a case. Related issues are
whether the Court should always explain its reasons for DIGging a
case, and what those reasons should be. We postpone those issues for a
fuller discussion in Part III. As that Part will reveal, there is already a
critical mass of scholarly literature on the Court's use of the DIG. What
is lacking is a comprehensive empirical overview of the DIG. Our
article seeks to fill that gap in the literature. We seek to answer three
particular empirical questions.
First, what are the characteristics of the cases that the Court tends
to DIG? In addition to providing a general description of DIGged cases,
we are interested in providing some background on several specific
issues. For example, we are interested in exploring whether the type of
case, broadly defined, influenced the Court's decision to DIG a case.
Perhaps the Court is more apt to DIG a case that raises more difficult
constitutional issues, as opposed to those that concern construction of
federal statutes. Justices may view constitutional cases as a whole as
raising more difficult and important issues, and if necessary may be
more willing to DIG such cases if, upon reflection, the case does not
squarely present the issue. Or the Court may find that it is unable to
assemble a majority or coherent position on such a case, and a DIG
39. See Hendrickson, supra note 29, at 3 & tbl. 1 (explaining that, during the
Burger Court, of fifty-eight cases DIGged, fifty were after oral argument took place).
40. For further discussion, see Stephen L. Wasby et al., The Supreme Court's
Use of Per Curiam Dispositions: The Connection to Oral Argument, 13 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 1, 6 (1992); James L. Walker, Research Note, DIGging on the Supreme Court:
Does Oral Argument Make a Difference? (research paper presented at the Interim
Meeting of the Int'l Pol. Sci. Ass'n Research Comm. on Comparative Judicial Studies,
Aug. 16-18, 1994) (on file with authors).
41. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 656-65 (2003) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
42. See STERN ET AL., supra note 30, at 297-99; Revesz & Karlan, supra note
4, at 1082.
1428
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enables the Court to postpone consideration of the issue presented.43
More generally, perhaps the reasons motivating the Court to DIG
cluster around certain types of cases, as opposed to being randomly
distributed among all cases where certiorari is granted.
We are also interested in exploring whether the Court, by a
collective opinion, or by concurring or dissenting opinions by
individual Justices, explains its decision to DIG a case. As we discuss
in Part III, there has been a significant amount of discussion regarding
whether the Court should explain its decision to utilize the DIG.
However, there has not been any systematic attempt to provide data on
how often the Court does provide an explanation and what sort of
explanation it provides when it chooses to do so. Collecting this data
will also allow us to explore whether the explanation tends to flow from
a majority, concurring, or dissenting opinion, and whether the Court or
Justices more often offer official explanations for a DIG in certain types
of cases.'
Finally, we explore other general characteristics of the cases
DIGged by the Court, such as the ideological direction of the lower
court under review and the ideological direction of the reviewing
Supreme Court decision. These variables help us to paint a better
picture of the types of cases that the Court has tended to DIG in recent
years.
That picture, however, would be incomplete without a
counterexample. Thus, the second empirical issue we address is
whether the cases that the Supreme Court tends to DIG are
43. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the United
States Supreme Court: An Empirical Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395 (2002)
(examining the reasons for which the Court may agree to review different proportions
of cases raising constitutional or statutory issues); Hendrickson, supra note 29, at 18;
Posner, supra note 24, at 38-40.
44. We only examined when the Court itself explained, via an opinion, why it
was DIGging. We did not systematically examine transcripts of oral argument or
secondary sources that may have suggested explanations for a DIG when the Court did
not offer an explanation (or, for that matter, even when it did). For two examples of the
former, see Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court to Consider Role of Intent in Age Bias,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2004, at A16 (pointing out that in Adams v. Fla. Power Corp.,
535 U.S. 228 (2002) (per curiam), in which no reason for the DIG was given, the
Justices dismissed the case "after the argument raised questions about whether the
company policies that were the basis for the complaint actually existed"), and Wasby et
al., supra note 40, at 12 (observing that in Diamond v. Louisiana, 376 U.S. 201 (1964)
(per curiam), in which no reason for the DIG was given, the Court was placed in a
difficult position where the counsel for a defendant in a civil rights case conceded that
the defendant had acted improperly, but the prosecution "was technically deficient,"
making it awkward for the Court to address the issues in the case) (citing, among other
sources, Jack Greenberg, The Supreme Court, Civil Rights & Civil Dissonance, 77
YALE L.J. 1520, 1534 (1968))).
2005:1421 1429
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systematically different from those cases that the Court decides on the
merits. Potentially, every case that the Court decides on the merits
represents a case that the Court could have DIGged, and thus, our
comparison group could be every case that the Court decides on the
merits. 45 In some of the data we present below, we engage in that sort
of comparison. Additionally, we use an alternative comparison group.
For that comparison group, we use cases that the Court considered
DIGging, but that were ultimately not DIGged. These are cases in
which a party, most likely the respondent, filed a motion to DIG,46 or
the Court on its own47 gave some consideration to the possibility of
DIGging the case. 48 We refer to this group as the "non-DIGged" cases.
The rationale for using this group of cases as a comparison group
is as follows. We assume that for the vast majority of the cases decided
on the merits, the option of DIGging the case was never a realistic
option, in the sense that neither the parties nor the Justices thought that
45. Indeed, the paper by Hendrickson analyzes DIGged decisions in the
context of all orally argued cases decided by the Burger Court under its certiorari
jurisdiction. Hendrickson, supra note 29, at 15 n.21.
46. The Supreme Court Rules do not expressly provide for a motion to DIG a
case, but parties have filed and the Court has disposed of such motions, anyway. See,
e.g., Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 535 n. 14 (1978). Cf SuP. CT. R. 21 (authorizing motions to the Court). This fact
might suggest that the Court does not always feel an obligation to make note of denials
of DIGs in the official reports.
47. The Supreme Court Rules make no mention of sua sponte authority to
DIG. However, since the Court does employ the DIG, and there is no evidence to
suggest that a DIG is only the result of a motion, it is apparent that the Court does, in
fact, DIG cases sua sponte.
48. We relied on reported decisions of the Court to identify these cases. For
example, the Court's opinion might note that it denied a motion to DIG. See Vt.
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 535 n. 14. Alternatively, the opinions of one
or more of Justices in a case may discuss having given some consideration to DIGging
the case. See, e.g., Fay v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 549 (1975) (separate opinion
of Douglas, J.). We did not seek to examine motions that may have been filed by one
or more parties requesting that the case be DIGged or available papers of retired or
deceased Justices that may have addressed this issue.
Examining such papers might be fruitful. For example, one recent study, based in part
on Justice Marshall's papers on a well-known case in administrative law, Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., indicate that
Justice Brennan made an unsuccessful effort to convince his brethren to DIG the case.
Gillian E. Metzger, The Story of Vermont Yankee: A Cautionary Tale of Judicial
Review and Nuclear Waste, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES (Peter Strauss ed.,
forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 47-49, on file with authors). It is nonetheless
interesting that the Court in Vermont Yankee explicitly discussed why it overruled a
motion by the respondent to DIG the case. 435 U.S. at 535 n.14. This is at least
suggestive to us that we are not missing a large number of DIGs not reflected in the
official reports. Cf supra note 46 (suggesting that not all dispositions of DIGs may be
reflected in the U.S. Reports).
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to be an available resolution of the case. In contrast, in the subgroup of
non-DIGged cases, the parties and the Justices in some way (as
revealed in the official reports) grappled with the option to DIG the
case. 49
Finally, we explore the possible strategic use of the DIG process.
For example, we are interested in studying the rate at which the legal
issue or issues in the DIGged cases return to the Court in a later case.
The fact that DIGged cases have already been through the certiorari
process provide a strong signal that the Justices thought the issue in the
case, in some shape or form, was of importance, or that the case
provided the vehicle for advancing a particular doctrinal point. Having
a case undergo the certiorari process once, and perhaps, as we discuss
below, having the Justices discuss the reasons why a case is now being
DIGged, sends information to future litigants as to what issues and
strategies are more likely to gain them a hearing before the Court in
future cases. Thus, the rate of return of DIGged issues might be
reflective of strategic behavior by some of the Justices regarding their
shaping of the Court's agenda. Conversely, DIGs might be evidence of
some Justices' attempts to remove cases from the agenda when those
Justices for various reasons do not want the Court to reach the merits.
B. Methodology
Our first task was to generate a list of all Supreme Court cases that
were DIGged. To do that, we used a computer search of the Westlaw
database of Supreme Court opinions.5 ° We examined a fifty-one year
period, covering the 1954 through 2004 Terms. That time span covers
the Warren (1954-1968 Terms), Burger (1969-1985 Terms) and
Rehnquist (1986-2004 Terms) Courts, and enables us to examine and
draw conclusions about the Court's use of the DIG in ways that
examining only one of those Courts, or a shorter time period, would
49. One perhaps can think of our non-DIGged sample as the low end in a
continuum of a sample of cases in which the Court considers the possibility of a DIG.
At the other end of the continuum will be all cases decided on the merits. Our sample
might be underinclusive, while the sample that includes all cases decided on the merits
might be overinclusive.
50. The search term was "improvident! w/10 grant," to capture the common
formulation of the words that make up the DIG acronym. For an example of the use of
the same search, see Hendrickson, supra note 29, at 13 n. 19. Like him, we also
examined the case citations found in various secondary sources cited in this Article to
determine if the search missed any cases commonly considered to have been DIGged.
Id. We found none. So, while we cannot say with absolute certainty that we found
every single DIGged case, we are confident that we found virtually every one for the
time period we are studying.
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not.5 Moreover, it enables us to compare and contrast those different
Courts, and to draw on the considerable social-science study of the
Court, most of which focuses on the post-World War II era. Our focal
point was decisions of the Court DIGging a case, in whole or in part.52
On those cases, we collected data on a number of variables both from
our own reading of the cases and from other available data sources."
We also compiled the cases in our comparison group, which we
refer to as the non-DIGged cases. As described above, these are cases
ultimately decided on the merits, but where the Court via a majority
opinion made references to a denial of a motion to DIG the case, or
where a concurring or dissenting Justice argued via a written opinion
that the Court should have DIGged the case, or at least, considered this
option.5"
Finally, we examined the post-DIG history of the issue that the
Court declined to review because of the DIG. We did not expect to find
many examples of the same case returning to the Court, though it did
happen.5 5 Instead, we were interested in determining whether the same
51. We could also have studied the Court's use of the DIG prior to the
Warren Court, on which the Court itself has provided some useful information. See
supra note 38 and accompanying text. But that is another study for another day.
52. A complete DIG dismisses the entire case. In a partial DIG, the Court
dismisses one issue, but goes on to decide the remaining issue or issues on the merits.
See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 n.1 (2001). Usually this
is explained by the Court in the decision on the merits. See, e.g., id. (DIGging an
Eleventh Amendment challenge to the application of Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act against states). In contrast, Hendrickson did not examine partial DIGs,
since his unit of analysis focused on the case (by docket number) and could not
accommodate these partial DIGs. Hendrickson, supra note 29, at 13 n.20.
53. In particular, we use the database on Supreme Court decisions developed
by Harold J. Spaeth. The database originally covered the Warren and Burger Courts,
but now has expanded to include the Vinson and Rehnquist Courts. The S. Sidney
Ulmer Project U.S. Supreme Court Databases, http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/
ulmerproject/sctdata.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2006) [hereinafter U.S. Supreme Court
Databases]; see also Harold J. Spaeth & Jeffrey A. Segal, The US. Supreme Court
Judicial Data Base: Providing New Insights into the Court, 83 JUDICATURE 228, 228
(2000); Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 23-24
(2002) (describing this database and its use by other scholars). In three cases, In Re
Zipkin, 369 U.S. 400 (1962), Stiles v. United States, 393 U.S. 219 (1968), and Holder
v. Banks, 417 U.S. 187 (1974), the lower court opinion was not published, and other
sources were not available to enable us to characterize the issues in the case or explore
whether the court revisited those issues in subsequent cases.
54. See, e.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 549 (1975) (Douglas, J.,
writing separately) (arguing that the case should be DIGged since Congress had allowed
the statute being considered to expire three months after certiorari was granted).
55. Three of the 155 DIGged cases returned to the Court. Two cases with the
same name, Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 380 U.S. 248 (1965) and
380 U.S. 249 (1965), were DIGged in 1965, and a separate appeal in the same
protracted litigation returned to the Court years later. Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World
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issue returned to the Court in separate, subsequent litigation. If a
relatively high number of the same issues did return, then it might
suggest, among other things, that the DIG is not as disruptive as
sometimes thought. It merely postpones the Court's resolution of an
issue. Here, we focused on the issue itself returning to the Court, and it
sometimes required difficult judgment calls on what was the same
issue.56 We also did not systematically consider whether the issue had
been resolved by means other than returning to the Court via
litigation.57
Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973). According to the dissent, the issue presented in the
DIGged cases was the same resolved eight years later. Id. at 392 & n.9 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). The third case is Atchley v. California, 366 U.S. 207 (1961). Additionally,
one case returned to the Court after further proceedings in the lower courts, and the
Court vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of the Court's recent
decision in a separate case that revisited the issue presented in the DIGged case. Bell v.
Abdur'Rahman, 125 S. Ct. 2991 (2005) (vacating and remanding in light of Gonzalez
v. Crosby, 125 S. Ct. 2641 (2005)).
56. Many times it was quite clear that the same issue returned to the Court.
See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 514 (2004) (mentioning that the issue
presented had been DIGged in Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 n.1 (2001)).
Other times it was not so clear, as it depended on the level of generality one gave to the
issue in the DIGged case. For example, in a case that was DIGged, New York v.
Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246 (1984) (per curiam), the Court was to consider a due process
challenge to a New York state law that prohibited loitering in a public place for the
purpose of soliciting another for "deviate" sexual behavior. Id. at 247. Is that the same
issue as the challenges to antisodomy statues of other states that the Court subsequently
considered in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) and Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003)? For the suggestion that all these cases, on their merits, presented
considerable doctrinal similarities, see Mary Anne Case, Of "This" and "That" in
Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 SuP. CT. REv. 75, 134-35; Bernard E. Harcourt, "You Are
Entering a Gay and Lesbian Free Zone": On the Radical Dissents of Justice Scalia and
Other (Post-) Queers, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 503, 538 (2004). But given that
Uplinger did not deal with an antisodomy statute as such, see 467 U.S. at 247 (stating
that the issue concerned the legality of a statute at least facially involving loitering for
the purpose of soliciting or engaging in "deviate" sex), we concluded that the same
issue was not presented in later cases. Needless to say, reasonable people can come out
different ways on the characterization issue presented in these and other DIGged cases.
57. The primary means we used to determine what the issue was in the first
place was the Court's or the Justices' opinions, if there were any, when the case was
DIGged. If that did not provide clarity, we then turned to the opinion of the lower court
being reviewed (which was usually, though not always, officially published) or the
briefing or the oral argument in the case, when the latter were available in electronic
databases. To determine if the same issue had returned to the Court, we variously
examined citations to the DIGged case, or the lower court opinion it would have
reviewed, or searched later Court cases using WestLaw keywords or head notes of the
DIGged case.
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C Analysis
The focal point of our research was to compile and examine the
cases that a majority of the Court DIGged, as well as those cases that
were a candidate for a DIG but that were ultimately decided on the
merits. Appendix I provides a list of the DIGged cases, and Appendix
II provides a list of the non-DIGged cases.58 In this section we discuss
our results on the first two of the three empirical issues identified
above. The third issue is discussed in Part III.
1. DESCRIBING THE DIGS
From 1954 to 2005, the Court DIGged 155 cases, which averages
about three per Term. In absolute terms, fifty-six (36.1 percent) of the
cases were DIGged during the Warren Court, while fifty-eight (37.4
percent) and forty-one (26.5 percent) were DIGged during the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts, respectively. Only twelve of the 155 cases were
DIGged before the Court heard oral arguments, seven of those
instances taking place in the Burger Court. Similarly, the Court tended
to use the DIG as a way of completely dismissing the case, as opposed
to avoiding a particular issue in a case. Only in fifteen of the 155 cases
(less than ten percent), did the Court partially DIG a case and go on to
decide the remaining aspects of the case on the merits.
By almost a two-to-one margin the cases that were directly DIGged
raised, in our judgment, federal constitutional issues, rather than
statutory, administrative, or various other nonconstitutional issues. We
classified fifty-four of the DIGs as not raising federal constitutional
issues, about thirty-six percent of the total. In contrast, over the same
period, the Court's plenary docket each Term almost always consisted
of over fifty percent nonconstitutional issues.59
We were also able to classify the ideological direction of the lower
court decision that the Supreme Court was reviewing, 6° as well as the
58. Appendix I includes the names and cites of the DIGged cases for the
period under study. We also include the data that we collected from the cases (whether
the case involved a constitutional or nonconstitutional issue, whether the Court
explained its decision to DIG, the vote lineup, and whether the same issue was later
decided by the Court). Other variables we use in each of the cases are available from
the U.S. Supreme Court Databases, supra note 53. See also Spaeth & Segal, supra note
53, at 234 (providing a table of database variables).
59. See Epstein et al., supra note 43, at 416-17 & fig.2 (providing data for the
1946 through 1992 Terms); Posner, supra note 24, at 37-38 & fig.2 (providing data for
the 1955 through 2003 Terms).
60. Spaeth classifies both the lower court decision and the Supreme Court
decision as liberal or conservative according to the following scheme. For example, "in
the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment,
1434
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direction of the Supreme Court's decision itself. About eighty-nine
percent (137 cases) of the DIGs are classified as involving a
conservative outcome at the lower court. Given that when the court
DIGs a case that has been conservatively decided by a lower court, the
Court in effect is sustaining a conservative outcome, we characterize
the direction of the Court's decisions as eighty-nine percent
conservative.
In close to half (seventy-three) of the 155 cases, the Court
provided an explanation for its decision to DIG the case in a majority
opinion. In twelve additional cases, a concurring or dissenting Justice
provided an explanation. Though such explanation does not formally
speak for a majority of the Court, it does provide insight on what the
Court, individually and collectively, was thinking. So in eighty-five of
the cases, or about fifty-five percent, there was some sort of
explanation provided by the Court or a Justice.
Table 1 shows both the number of DIGs and the number of cases
in which the Court, or an individual Justice, explained the decision to
DIG. The rate of explanation held fairly constant during the Warren
and Burger Courts, but fell dramatically during the Rehnquist Court.
Table 1. Proportion of DIGged Cases in Which the Court Provided an
Explanation
Court DIGged Cases Cases in Which Percent
Explanation Provided
Warren Court 56 36 64.3%
Burger Court 58 34 58.6%
Rehnquist Court 41 15 36.6%
Total 155 85 54.8%
With regard to the type of issue involved in the DIGged cases for
which the Court provided some kind of explanation, our data indicates
that about two-thirds (sixty-seven percent) of these eighty-five cases
involved constitutional issues. Finally, as described above,61 we were
interested in determining whether the same issue that was DIGged
due process, privacy, and attorneys," a liberal outcome is, among other factors, "pro-
person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial; pro-civil liberties or civil
rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g.,
homosexualityD]; pro-child or juvenile; pro-indigent; pro-Indian; pro-affirmative
action; pro-neutrality in religion cases; [and] pro-female in abortion." HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE ORIGINAL UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL DATABASE 1953-
2003 TERMS, DOCUMENTATION 58 (2005), available at http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/
ulmerproject/allcourtcodebook.pdf.
61. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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returned to the Court in separate, subsequent litigation. We identified
sixty-six such cases.
2. EXPLAINING THE DIGS
We then compared those cases that the Court DIGged to the non-
DIGged cases-the group of cases that the Court considered DIGging,
but that it ultimately decided on the merits. The list we compiled is
provided in Appendix 11.62 We identified 171 issue-cases ("cases"), 63
seventy-nine (46.2 percent) during the Warren Court, fifty-eight (33.9
percent) during the Burger Court, and thirty-four (19.9 percent) during
the Rehnquist Court.
Our data allow us to provide some insight into some of the factors
that could affect the Court's decision to DIG a case. First, we explore
the relationship between the decision to DIG and the type of issue
involved in the case. Table 2 shows the cross-tabulation of the type of
issue involved in the case (using our "constitutional" or "other"
categorization) and whether or not the Court DIGged the case. The data
demonstrate that the Court is more likely to DIG cases raising
constitutional issues. These results are consistent with the view that the
Court might prefer to avoid resolving cases on constitutional grounds,
or avoid such cases altogether, either because of their complexity or
divisiveness on the Court itself, or because of their political saliency.
The Court appears to use the DIG as a device, a second opportunity
after the certiorari decision itself, to avoid resolving perhaps difficult
and contentious constitutional issues.
Table 2. Decision to DIG and Type of Case 64
DIGged non-DIGged Total
Constitutional 98 (64.5%) 76 (44.4%) 174
Other 54 (35.5%) 95(55.5%) 149
Total 152 171 323
62. Appendix II provides a list of the names and cites of those cases, as well
as the information we collected about those cases. As with the list of DIGged cases, we
also used information from the Spaeth data sets. See U.S. Supreme Court Databases,
supra note 53.
63. Spaeth classifies twenty-three of these cases as involving the resolution of
multiple legal issues. U.S. Supreme Court Databases, supra note 53. Our reading of
those cases suggests that the Court could have DIGged any of those issues and resolved
the remaining issues. Accordingly, we treated each issue as a separate data point in our
list. For the list of the twenty-three cases, see notes to Appendix II.
64. Table 2 presents frequencies and parenthetically presents column
percentages. Chi-Square = 12.99, significant at the .001 level. We could not classify
three of the DIGged cases. For the data sources see supra note 53.
1436
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When calculated across different Courts, though, the results
indicate that the relationship between the type of issue and the decision
to DIG a case was statistically significant during the Warren Court, but
not significant during either the Burger or Rehnquist Courts. It is not
entirely clear why this is the case. Perhaps defying conventional
wisdom, there was a higher percentage of nonconstitutional issues on
the docket of the Warren Court as compared to the subsequent Courts.
But perhaps the constitutional cases that the Warren Court did decide
were, comparatively speaking, more controversial or difficult than the
constitutional cases decided by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.65
In Table 3 we explore the relationship between the Court's
decision to DIG and the ideological direction of the lower court's
decision. As described above, an overwhelming majority (about eighty-
eight percent) of the DIGged cases were decided in a conservative
direction by the lower court. Prior research advances the hypothesis
that a conservative Supreme Court will be more likely to DIG a
conservative lower court decision and that the opposite will hold for a
liberal leaning Supreme Court.' The rationale is twofold.67 First,
various scholars have noted that a Court benefits more from reversing
an unfavorable lower court decision than in upholding a favorable
one.68 Second, DIGging a case eliminates the possibility, however
small, that the ideological minority in the Court will convince a
member of the ideological majority to switch positions, upsetting the
expectations of the balance of that majority.69
Our data confirm the "conservative" half of this hypothesis in
more ways than one. As shown in panels (B) and (C) of Table 3, both
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts were more likely to DIG cases
decided conservatively by the lower court, ninety-one percent and
eighty-five percent of the time, respectively. On the other hand, less
than thirty-seven percent of the non-DIGged cases were decided
conservatively by the lower court.
65. The comparative data on DIGs is on file with the authors. Data on the
comparative dockets of the three Courts in question can be found in Epstein et al.,
supra note 43, at 416-17 & fig.2.
66. See Hendrickson, supra note 29, at 11.
67. See id. at 11-12.
68. Id. at 11. By this we mean that a Court presumably seeking, in whole or
in part, to pursue policy goals will have less incentive, all things being equal, to review
a lower court decision that reached the correct decision in the minds of the majority of
the Justices.
69. Id. at 12.
14372005:1421
HeinOnline  -- 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 1437 2005
1438 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
Table 3. Decision to DIG and Direction of Lower Court Decision
Panel A. Warren Court7"
DIGged Non-DIGged Total
Conservative 51(91.1%) 66(86.8%) 117
Lower Court
Decision
Liberal 5 (8.9%) 10 (13.2%) 15
Lower Court
Decision
Total 56 76 132
Panel B. Burger Court71
DIGged Non-DIGged Total
Conservative 52 (91.3%) 22(37.9%) 74
Lower Court
Decisions
Liberal 5 (8.7%) 36(62.1%) 41
Lower Court
Decision
Total 57 58 115
Panel C. Rehnquist Court72
DIGged Non-DIGged Total
Conservative 34 (85.0%) 11(33.3%) 45
Lower Court
Decision
Liberal 6 (15.0%) 22 (66.7%) 28
Lower Court
Decision
Total 40 33 73
These results indicate, as suggested in the literature, that a
conservative Court is more likely to DIG a conservative lower court
decision, and thus advance its presumed ideological preferences by first
letting a conservative lower ruling stand, and second using its limited
70. Panel A presents frequencies and parenthetically presents column
percentages. Chi-Square = .57. This value is not statistically significant.
71. Panel B presents frequencies and parenthetically presents column
percentages. Chi-Square = 35.60, significant at the .001 level.
72. Panel C presents frequencies and parenthetically presents column
percentages. Chi-Square = 20.41, significant at the .001 level. There is one missing
value for one of the DIGged cases, resulting in one of the cases dropping out of the
analysis.
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resources in dealing with liberally decided lower court decisions.1
3
Notice that about two-thirds of the non-DIGged cases decided by the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts were liberally decided by the lower
courts. Additional analysis shows that, as one would have expected, the
non-DIGged cases were on average decided in a conservative direction
by both the Burger Court (56.9 percent) and the Rehnquist Court (63.6
percent).
However, Panel (A) in Table 3 does not support the other half of
the hypothesis. The Warren Court, a liberal court, was not more likely
to DIG liberal cases. As expected, however, with regard to those cases
decided on the merits in the non-DIGged group, the Warren Court
reviewed almost six times as many conservatively decided than liberally
decided lower court decisions. 7"
3. SUMMARY
Our results shed some new light on the somewhat obscure practice
of the DIG. First, while a relatively rare event as compared to the
number of cases decided each Term, the DIGs could be considered a
somewhat more significant occurrence when compared to what we
suggest is the more relevant group of non-DIGged cases. Second, our
results indicate that the DIG has been used across Courts of different
ideological compositions as a fairly conservative instrument. That is, to
a significant extent, cases that have been DIGged have resulted in an
outcome that can be described as an ideologically conservative one.
Third, the ideological direction of the lower court's ruling appears at
the same time to be significantly related to the likelihood of a case
being DIGged by the Supreme Court, at least where the Court can be
classified as conservative. Finally, our results indicate that the Court
might also use the DIG process as a way of avoiding more difficult or
contentious constitutional issues.
73. See id. at 11-12.
74. The relatively high percentage of conservative lower court decisions
DIGged by the Warren Court is probably related to the fact that, as compared to the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts, the Warren Court faced a much higher proportion of
conservative lower court cases. Using the Spaeth database, the proportion of
conservative to liberal lower court opinions faced by the Warren Court is approximately
seventy-five conservative to twenty-five liberal. U.S. Supreme Court Databases, supra
note 53. That is, the Warren Court was facing conservative lower court opinions by a
three-to-one margin. However, for the Burger and Rehnquist Courts the proportion of
conservative to liberal lower court decisions is approximately one to one. Id. Still, as
our results indicate, these two Courts were significantly more likely to DIG
conservative lower court decisions, as compared to liberally decided lower court
decisions. We thank Scott Hendrickson for bringing this point to our attention.
14392005:1421
HeinOnline  -- 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 1439 2005
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
III. THE DIG AND LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL NORMS OF THE
SUPREME COURT
Congress bestowed the certiorari power on the Supreme Court by
statute, but virtually everything else about the Court's agenda-setting
process (and much else) is not created or regulated by positive law-the
Constitution, statutes, or even the Court's own rules. Instead, many
aspects of the Court's processes are the result of, and governed by,
informal agreements among the Justices." These agreements, or norms,
have been the subject of increasing attention by scholars,76 in part
because the development of such norms are as much, if not more,
important than the application of formal legal rules."7 In political
institutions, norms can structure interactions among participants. 8 They
"represent an equilibrium among participants-no actor, given current
information and its current position, can improve its position on its
own."" Norms are subject to self-enforcement, and given their
plasticity, are subject to change and even abandonment for various
reasons." The most obvious external shock to a norm can be the
addition of new Justices who, to varying degrees, disagree with the
norm. 8' The Court's agenda-setting process can be profitably examined
as an example of the evolution of norms.82
In this Part, we reexamine some aspects of the Court's application
of the DIG through the lens of the scholarly literature on norms. We
have both descriptive and normative agendas in this Part. We consider
why certain aspects of the norms governing the DIG are as they are,
why they have or have not evolved, and evaluate the soundness of some
of those practices and offer suggestions for change.
75. See Gregory A. Caldeira & Christopher J.W. Zorn, Of Time and
Consensual Norms hi the Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. Sci. 874, 875-76 (1998).
76. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000).
77. See Caldeira & Zorn, supra note 75, at 875 (discussing the "explosion of
conflict" that has resulted in "the demise of consensual norms" in the Court).
78. See id. at 875-76.
79. Id. at 876 (citation omitted).
80. Id.
81. See id. at 876-77.
82. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 24, at 639-51 (examining the decline of the
Court's docket in light of norm theory, and attributing the decline to, among other
things, change in membership on the Court). We do not wish to overstate the point
regarding the juridical source of the Rule of Four and the DIG. Recall that both were
referenced by the Justices in their testimony to Congress prior to the passage of the
Judges' Bill. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. In some limited sense,
then, it might be said that the Bill effectively codified the Rule of Four and the DIG.
Even that observation, of course, leaves open for discussion how those devices have
been or should be used by the Court, the subject of this Part of the Article.
1440
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A. How Many Votes to DIG?
It is a well-established norm that only the votes of four Justices are
necessary to grant certiorari. What is much less established, as we
demonstrate below, is how many votes are necessary to DIG a case.
Given the Court's long-standing lack of transparency on many aspects
of its decision making, perhaps it is no shock that we do not know the
answer (if there is one) to this seemingly simple issue. Instead, to
obtain anything near an authoritative answer, we must rely on those
instances when one or more Justices have felt moved to comment on the
issue in published opinions. These cases have already been the subject
of considerable discussion in the literature,83 so we will forego a
lengthy summary and instead focus on the highlights.
Credit for first publicly engaging the Court on this issue belongs to
Justice Frankfurter. In 1952, writing separately in a case that the
majority resolved on the merits, he stated that he would have DIGged
the case, because for him the issues were unique and unlikely to recur,
and thus certiorari should never have been granted in the first place.
84
Dissenting on the merits in the same case, Justice William Douglas
added that a Justice who votes to deny certiorari should not thereafter
be able to vote to DIG a case, absent a change of mind by one of at
least four Justices who voted to hear the case.85 Absent such a
requirement, he said, "[tlhe integrity of the four-vote rule on certiorari
would then be impaired."86 The five (if there were up to five) Justices
who did not vote to grant certiorari could dismiss the case, thus
negating the wishes of the other four Justices. 7
The debate was played out in greater detail four years later, in four
cases decided on the same day.88 The focal point for our purposes is
Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines.9 The Justices reached the
merits of Ferguson and the three other cases; 9° however, Justice
83. See FALLON JR. ET AL., supra note 30, at 1603-09; STERN ET AL., supra
note 30, at 298; Blumstein, supra note 30, at 926-28; Revesz & Karlan, supra note 4, at
1082-95.
84. United States v. Shannon, 342 U.S. 288, 294-97 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
writing separately).
85. Id. at 298 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. See id.
88. Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521 (1957);
Herdman v. Pa. R.R., 352 U.S. 518 (1957); Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500
(1957); Webb v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 352 U.S. 512 (1957).
89. 352 U.S. 521 (1957).
90. See id. at 523-24; Herdman, 352 U.S. at 520; Rogers, 352 U.S. at 511;
Webb, 352 U.S. at 517.
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Frankfurter dissented in Ferguson, refused to cast a vote on the merits,
argued that certiorari should not have been granted, and concluded that
the case should have been DIGged.91 Unlike his opinion in the 1952
case, this time he responded to the argument that maintaining the
integrity of the Rule of Four required all of the Justices to vote on the
merits of the case, at least when "no new factor emerges after argument
and deliberation. ' 92 According to Justice Frankfurter, that argument
was incorrect.93  The initial decision to grant certiorari "must
necessarily be based on a limited appreciation of the issues in a case,
resting as it so largely does on the partisan claims in briefs of
counsel."94 After oral argument and deliberation, a Justice may feel
strengthened in his view that granting certiorari was inappropriate." So
a case should be DIGged for that reason as well.96 Such a posture, he
continued, does no violence to the Rule of Four, which he said he
would not change.97 He referenced the "historic" right of a Justice to
dissent, which he called "essential to an effective judiciary in a
democratic society, and especially for a tribunal exercising the powers
of this Court."98 The Court "operates ultimately by a majority," he
continued, and the Justices in that majority do not give up their "right
to vote on the ultimate disposition of the case as conscience directs." 99
His assault on the Rule of Four, he argued, had been overstated.'O In
the "usual instance," he said, a Justice will defer to the views of the
other members of the Court who desire to hear the case on the
merits.l°1 But that deference should not hold "when a class of cases is
systemically taken for review," such that "insignificant and unimportant
questions . . . unduly drain[]" the Court's time.0 2 That was true, he
said, of the particular issues raised in Ferguson and its companion
litigation. 103
91. Ferguson, 352 U.S. at 524-29 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (expressing
dissent in the decisions of Ferguson, Herdman, Rogers, and Webb).
92. Id. at 527.
93. Id.
94. Id.






101. Id. at 529.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 528-29. The cases involved the Federal Employers' Liability Act
(FELA) and the Jones Act, which Justice Frankfurter argued at length that the Court
had spent entirely too much time on. Id. at 529-48. For a further discussion of Justice
1442
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Justice John Marshall Harlan responded to Justice Frankfurter. He
agreed that certiorari should not have been granted but contended that
once it was, all of the Justices had an obligation to reach the merits."
The integrity of the Rule of Four, he wrote, requires that the merits be
reached, at least "in the absence of considerations appearing which
were not manifest or fully apprehended at the time certiorari was
granted."° 5 The right to dissent from the decision to grant certiorari, he
continued, "without the presence of intervening factors-is exhausted
once the petition has been granted and the cause set for argument."1 06 In
short, it would "stultify" the Rule of Four "if it were permissible for a
writ of certiorari to be annulled by the later vote of five objecting
Justices." 0 7 Six other Justices concurred in the pertinent parts of Justice
Harlan's separate opinion. 108
His opinion did not lack for ambiguity. It was not clear what
"intervening factors" would be, or who would decide the presence or
relevance of those factors--the five Justices who voted to deny
certiorari, or one or more of the four who granted certiorari.
Nonetheless, a position agreed to by seven Justices would seem to
establish a durable precedent, as indeed it did, for the Court as a whole
did not publicly return to the issue until 1971. In that year, five Justices
in Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie ° DIGged a case over the
dissent of the four Justices who voted to grant certiorari."' The
majority did not deign to collectively provide a reason for the DIG, but
Frankfurter's views on FELA and related cases, see STERN ET AL., supra note 30, at
299 n.42.
104. Ferguson, 352 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., concurring in Herdman, dissenting
in Ferguson, Rogers, and Webb).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 559-60 (footnote omitted).
107. Id. at 560. He also argued that Justice Frankfurter's self-imposed caveat
of limiting his position to instances when four Justices systematically grant certiorari to
a "class of cases" was no limit at all. Id. at 561-62. The majority of Justices would still
disagree with the minority on the propriety of reviewing that "class of cases." Id.
108. Part I of Justice Harlan's opinion is relevant here, as it contained his
rebuttal to Justice Frankfurter. Id. at 559-62. Part II of Justice Harlan's opinion
considered the merits of the four cases in question. Id. at 562. Justice Burton concurred
in Part I of Justice Harlan's opinion. Id. at 564. Chief Justice Warren, and Justices
Black, Brennan, Clark, and Douglas concurred in Part I of Harlan's opinion, except as
it pertained to Justice Harlan's disapproval of the grant of certiorari in the cases. Id. at
564. However, it is most relevant that six justices concurred in Justice Harlan's rebuttal
to Justice Frankfurter's insistence that the cases should have been DIGged.
109. 402 U.S. 497 (1971) (per curiam).
110. Normally the Justices do not reveal their votes on whether to grant or
deny certiorari in any particular case. The information occasionally surfaces in opinions
(if there are any) accompanying a DIGged case. For an example, see id. at 508
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Justice Harlan did in a concurring opinion."1 He stated that changes to
the federal statute under review, coupled with other changes to the
factual and legal landscape of the case, as revealed at oral argument and
in the briefing on the merits, were circumstances that justified a DIG of
the case.112
Justice Douglas, writing for the dissenters, argued that the DIG in
this case violated earlier guidelines, for none of the four Justices who
voted to grant certiorari had changed his mind on the propriety of
reviewing the case. 1 3 He appeared to be saying that the majority of the
Court could DIG a case so long as at least one of the Justices originally
granting certiorari agreed that there were now changed circumstances.
Otherwise, he argued, the Rule of Four would be converted to a Rule
of Five. " 4 Put another way, Justice Douglas was arguing that a Rule of
Six was necessary to DIG a case-the five Justices who denied
certiorari, and at least one who did not. 5
The last major1 6 consideration by the Court of these issues was in
1984 in New York v. Uplinger. 7 There the Court had granted a writ
of certiorari by a county district attorney to review a decision of New
York courts striking down a state statute prohibiting loitering for the
purpose of soliciting others for various sexual activities. " The majority
DIGged the case, explaining that the "precise federal constitutional
issue" presented by the case was unclear, because the opinion below
was "fairly subject to varying interpretations."'1 9 That, coupled with a
brief by the attorney general of New York filed after certiorari was
granted, arguing the statute was unconstitutional,120 meant that the case
was "an inappropriate vehicle for resolving the important constitutional
111. Id. at 497 (Harlan, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 498-501.
113. Id. at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
114. Id.
115. It would appear that, under Justice Douglas' position, there would be a
Rule of Six even if more than four Justices voted to grant certiorari. According to this
position, if all nine Justices voted to hear the case, then a six-Justice majority would
still be necessary to DIG the case. To permit only five Justices to DIG under those
circumstances would still undermine at least four Justices who desired to hear the case.
116. This is not to say that the Court or individual Justices have been otherwise
silent. For example, one year after Triangle, Justice Douglas, dissenting alone from a
DIG, contended that a DIG should occur "only in exceptional situations and where all
nine members of the Court agree." Iowa Beef Packers, Inc. v. Thompson, 405 U.S.
228, 232 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Such a Rule of Nine departs from his
previous views. Revesz & Karlan, supra note 4, at 1087 n.89.
117. 467 U.S. 246 (1984) (per curiam).
118. Id. at 247.
119. Id. at 248.
120. Id. at 247 n. 1.
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issues raised by the parties." 121 In a two-sentence dissent, Justice Byron
White, joined by three other Justices, argued that a DIG was "not the
proper course," since the federal constitutional issues were "properly
before" the Court. 1
22
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens contended that the DIG
made "no change in the Rule [of Four]," but he regarded it "as
sufficiently significant to warrant . . . additional comments. " 123 In those
comments, Justice Stevens contended that "the major reasons [justifying
the DIG] were apparent when the certiorari petition was filed" and
asserted that the dissent had not contested the arguments for a DIG in
the majority's per curiam opinion. 121 "It might be suggested," he
continued, "that the case must be decided unless there has been an
intervening development that justifies a dismissal." 125 He was "now
persuaded, however, that there is always an important intervening
development that may be decisive." 126 Pointing out that constitutional
issues in particular must be addressed with care and restraint, Justice
Stevens contended that the Rule of Four did not compel a case to be
heard once a majority had examined the full record and arguments and
concluded that the case was an "unwise vehicle" to decide the question
presented. 27 The Rule of Four, he wrote, grants the power to four
Justices to require that a case be "briefed, argued, and considered at a
postargument conference," but it does not "compel the majority to
decide the case. '1 28 He concluded that The Rule of Four "is a valuable,
though not immutable, device for deciding when a case must be argued,
but its force is largely spent once the case had been heard. "1
29
What, then, is the legal landscape for the voting protocols of the
DIG device after these cases? An easy answer is not possible. Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion in Ferguson can be read for the
proposition that at least six votes are necessary to DIG a case. Yet in
Triangle, Uplinger, and other cases found in our study, 13 the Court
121. 1d. at 249.
122. Id. at 252 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist, J., and
O'Connor, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 249 (Stevens, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 249-50.
125. Id. at 250.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 251.
128. Id. at 250-51.
129. Id. at 251.
130. See Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (2005) (per curiam); Parker v.
Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991); City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257 (1987) (per
curiam); New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246 (1984) (per curiam); NLRB v.
Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170 (1981); Walter v.
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DIGged cases with four Justices dissenting from the action. So the post-
Ferguson cases can be read to suggest that DIGs are possible with just
five votes, at least under some (or many) circumstances. Indeed, in
their careful analysis of these cases, Richard Revesz and Pamela Karlan
argue that Justice Harlan had shifted his position in Triangle from that
in Ferguson, since in the former case he implicitly argued that only five
Justices need to agree on the presence of changed circumstances. 131
Similarly, they contend that the majority opinion and Justice Stevens'
concurring opinion in Uplinger essentially adopt Justice Frankfurter's
dissent in Ferguson, as they apparently read both Uplinger opinions to
permit five Justices to DIG for any reason, not merely for reasons not
apparent at the time certiorari was granted. '32
We do not fully agree with this critique and find more continuity in
the cases than these critics suggest. Recall that Justice Harlan's opinion
in Ferguson did not state that six or more votes were needed to DIG
under all circumstances. 33 Instead, he at least implied that five votes
would suffice if there were changed or intervening circumstances. 13
There was no majority opinion explaining the DIG in Triangle.135 In
that case, Justice Harlan concurred only for himself, but he emphasized
what he characterized as the "changed posture of the case, ' 136 arising
from various issues raised after certiorari was granted. The case put to
rest any question that five votes were not enough under any
circumstances, 137 but we do not read it as adopting Justice Frankfurter's
position. Likewise, the majority opinion in Uplinger referred to several
United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980); Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie, 402
U.S. 497 (1971) (per curiam); Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548 (1971) (per
curiam); Miller v. California, 392 U.S. 616 (1968) (per curiam); Harmer v. DeMarcus,
390 U.S. 736 (1968) (per curiam); NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U.S. 118 (1966) (per
curiam); Smith v. Butler, 366 U.S. 161 (1961) (per curiam); Monrosa v. Carbon Black
Export, Inc., 359 U.S. 180 (1959); Ellis v. Dixon, 349 U.S. 458 (1955).
131. Revesz & Karlan, supra note 4, at 1092-93; see also Triangle, 402 U.S. at
508 n.7 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the action of the majority was adopting
the position of Justice Frankfurter).
132. Revesz & Karlan, supra note 4, at 1090-91; see also STERN ET AL., supra
note 30, at 298-99 (suggesting that Uplinger, and Justice Stevens' concurrence thereto,
can be read as a departure from earlier DIG cases).
133. See Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 560-61
(1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in Herdman, dissenting in Ferguson, Rogers, and
Webb).
134. See id.
135. See Triangle, 402 U.S. at 497.
136. Id. at 502 (Harlan, J., concurring). He claimed to be faithful to his
opinion in Ferguson. Id. at 497 (citing Ferguson, 352 U.S. at 559-62, 564 (Harlan, J.,
concurring in Herdman, dissenting in Ferguson, Rogers, and Webb)).
137. Pre- Triangle DIGs had done the same thing. See supra note 130 (listing
cases).
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circumstances that, in its view, had changed since certiorari was
granted.138 In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens did the same.
139
Justice Stevens went on to make statements (in what may be regarded
as dicta) that can be read to suggest that the majority can simply DIG
the case, even in the absence of changed circumstances. 140 But even he
framed it as a power to be weighed against the normal presumption of
reaching the merits of a case once certiorari is granted. 141
We think these cases can best be read as establishing a presumptive
Rule of Six to DIG a case, unless five Justices decide that there are
indeed changed circumstances, in which case that is sufficient for a
DIG. The five Justices can be the same five who did not vote to grant
certiorari. 42 So stated, this may not seem like much of a rule; the
exception might be read as swallowing the rule. But what is more
remarkable is that, insofar as the Court's opinions tell us, the exception
has been invoked relatively infrequently. That is, the vast majority of
DIGs are by six or more votes. We collected data on the vote lineup in
all the cases that the Court DIGged during the 1954-2005 period.
Figure 1 summarizes the findings.





- 1 ---- 44-12
10
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Vote Lineup
m Freq. DIGged Cases 1
138. New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246, 248-49 (1984) (per curiam).
139. See id. at 249 (Stevens, J., concurring).
140. See id. at 250-51.
141. See id. Cf STERN ET AL., supra note 30, at 299 n.42 (reviewing Justice
Frankfurter's views in Ferguson, but adding that "[n]o other Justice has endorsed this
position").
142. Indeed, as a reviewer of an earlier draft of this Article observed,
depending on the makeup of those five Justices, a 5-4 decision to DIG may not threaten
the Rule of Four at all. If all of the four Justices (if there were only four) who voted to
grant certiorari change their minds, and now wish to DIG, joined by at least one other
Justice, then it is difficult to characterize that action as undermining the Rule of Four.
Given that the Court rarely reveals the votes of individual Justices on certiorari
petitions, in the context of DIGs or otherwise, see supra note 110, it is difficult to
determine from the public record how often this happens.
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As Figure 1 illustrates, in only fourteen cases did the Court decide
to DIG with less than a "supermajority" of at least sixty percent in
favor of a DIG. Even when acting with less than a full Court, the norm
of having more than a simple majority held strong in the DIGs. The
data in Figure 1 also shows that eighty-three of the 155 DIGs (53.5
percent) were decided without a recorded dissent by the Court, 143 and
that the Court went on to explain its decision to DIG the case in only
thirty of these eighty-three cases (36.1 percent).' 44 The relatively low
number of 5-4 decisions (fourteen, or nine percent), the relatively high
number of decisions without a recorded dissent (53.5 percent), and the
apparent noncontroversial nature of the decision to DIG, as reflected in
the relatively low rate of an opinion by the Court explaining the DIG,
are consistent with the presence of the Rule of Six.
Why is the norm of the Rule of Six so durable? No doubt, it is for
largely the reasons that the Rule of Four is still followed. On its face, it
is an agenda-setting device that still leaves the majority in control of the
resolution on the merits (even if the majority would have originally
denied certiorari). 45 The power to DIG may be attractive to different
sets of Justices at different times. Justices know they may not always be
in a majority on how to dispose of any given case. Viewed ex ante, the
Justices may feel that a Rule of Six should be left in place as a matter
of intra-Court reciprocity and harmony. "
143. Following the coding scheme used by Spaeth, see U.S. Supreme Court
Databases, supra note 53, we coded the vote in the decisions in which no dissent was
recorded as "7 to 0," "8 to 0," or "9 to 0," as the case might have been. During a
comparable time period (1954-2001) the average proportion per Term of unanimous
decisions on the merits was 38.4 percent. See Epstein et al., supra note 43, at 209-10.
144. The proportion of unanimous-DIG cases in which the Court provided an
explanation (36.1 percent) is lower that the overall proportion of cases in which the
majority of the Court provided an explanation (forty-seven percent).
145. See Vermeule, supra note 30, at 74.
146. Id. at 90, 92. The strength of the norm might be further evidenced by the
majority's decision to issue a justificatory opinion when it invokes the exception. This,
however, is not always the case. Blumstein, supra note 30, at 930. In the fourteen
examples of DIGs by 5-4 votes mentioned earlier, see supra note 130 and
accompanying text, in four cases the majority of the Court did not issue an opinion. See
Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie, 402 U.S. 497 (1971) (per curiam); Miller v.
California, 392 U.S. 616 (1968) (per curiam); Hanner v. DeMarcus, 390 U.S. 736
(1968) (per curiam); NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U.S. 118 (1966) (per curiam). And of
those four, only in Triangle did a member of the majority provide an explanation in a
separate opinion. Triangle, 402 U.S. at 497 (Harlan, J., concurring). Yet seventy-one
percent of those DIGs were explained by the majority, a higher percentage than
majority explanations for DIGs as a whole. Furthermore, two of these cases involved
partial DIGs. Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 323 (1991); Walter v. United States,
447 U.S. 649, 652 n.4 (1980). By our reading, the opinion of the four dissenters in
each case did not specifically take issue with the decision to DIG by the majority.
Overall, then, the data seems to support the argument "that systematic departures from
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Whatever may be the judicial motivations for retaining some
version of a Rule of Six, we think it is sound policy as well. The
rationale for the Rule is largely derivative of that for the Rule of Four,
in that both permit a minority of the Court to place on the docket (or
retain it, once there) what it considers an important case.147 Permitting a
minority in a political institution to check the power of the majority
resonates with a long-standing antimajoritarian (or, better put,
supermajoritarian) impulse in American life."4 More than that, the Rule
of Six, as Adrian Vermeule has argued, "can force majoritarian
accountability"149 and transparency, by preventing "an entrenched 5-
Justice majority from simply disposing of disfavored claims through
low-visibility procedures." 50 In short, it counteracts "the ability of
majorities to exploit various low-visibility techniques for disposing of
cases in unprincipled ways." 5
the Rule of Four [that is, a DIG by a 5-4 vote] remain rare because they may generate
informal sanctions such as a... dissent, which would make public otherwise private
information about the certiorari vote." LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES
JUSTICES MAKE 121 (1998).
147. See Stevens, supra note 31, at 21.
148. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003); Heather K.
Gerken, Dissenting by Deciing, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1745 (2005); John 0. McGinnis &
Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEx. L. REV. 703
(2002).
149. See Vermeule, supra note 30, at 81.
150. Id. at 82 (footnote omitted).
151. Id. For similar reasons advanced in support of a supermajority
requirement for the DIG, see Leiman, supra note 26, at 988-90 (arguing that allowing
only five Justices to DIG a case undermines the Rule of Four if allowed prior to oral
arguments); Revesz & Karlan, supra note 4, at 1105 (stating that the Rule of Four,
unless compromised by a simple majority rule, can allow "a minority to bring before
the Court ... issues ... to expose weaknesses in the underpinning of the majority's
position and thereby to create a propitious climate for overruling that position").
Writing over two decades ago, Justice Stevens raised the possibility of abandoning the
Rule of Four, perhaps for a majority rule. Stevens, supra note 31, at 14-21. But he was
heavily influenced in that belief by the Court's large docket on the merits at that time,
and suggested that the Court was accepting too many cases for review. Id. at 16. He
further suggested that the Rule of Four "might" be abandoned, or "perhaps" not
followed whenever the docket "backlog reaches a predetermined point." Id. at 20-21.
Though not expressly addressed by Justice Stevens, one corollary of abandoning the
Rule of Four for certiorari petitions could be to establish a Rule of Five to DIG all
cases. The supermajority rule to DIG could be viewed as unnecessary if there is not a
submajority rule to protect. Perhaps these views informed his concurring opinion in
Upinger, decided a year after his article was published; he cites the article in his
concurring opinion. New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246, 249 & n.2 (1984) (Stevens,
J., concurring). At any rate, the Court's plenary docket has declined considerably since
Upinger was decided, and Justice Stevens may not feel as strongly about curbing the
Rule of Four (or freeing the DIG from the shackles of the Rule of Six) as he did in
1984. For more recent views by Justice Stevens, see United States v. Williams, 504
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From these reasons we need not go so far as to conclude that cases
should never be DIGged. To forbid a DIG, even by a unanimous Court,
would improperly and unnecessarily entrench an earlier agenda-setting
decision, whether by four, or more, Justices. The point is that the DIG
power should be permitted to be exercised, but only, as Vermeule puts
it, in principled ways. 152 What are those ways? One piece of the answer
is a supermajority requirement. Ideally, that would perhaps entirely
prohibit the "changed circumstances" exception to the Rule of Six that
we glean from the cases. But if the circumstances are indeed changed,
it drains the significance of the Rule for that particular case. From our
study, we do not find the majority routinely exploiting the exception,
suggesting that it is but a marginal inroad on the Rule of Six. 153
B. Principled Reasons to DIG a Case
Much of the literature addresses what constitutes principled
reasons to DIG a case. Yet is it superfluous to address that issue, given
the Rule of Six (with or without a narrow exception for a Rule of Five
in some instances)? In other words, if there is a supermajority
requirement to DIG a case, does it matter what reasons the Court,
collectively or individually, may have to DIG? Does that requirement
sufficiently protect the Rule of Four, without the additional burden of
formulating and articulating reasons to justify the dismissal? Apparently
the Court often thinks that it is not burdensome to offer reasons, since it
does so in a majority of the DIGs. We think there is good reason for
that norm. The voting protocol does protect the Rule of Four, but
principled decision making does suggest that the exercise of the power
to DIG should be for defensible reasons.
Robert Stern and his colleagues have listed no less than sixteen
reasons that the Court itself has offered to justify a DIG.154 The reasons
include, among others, that "an important issue may be found not to be
presented in the record"; the Court concludes that it "cannot reach the
U.S. 36, 60 n.7 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting), where he states that "a majority" of
the Court can DIG a case, and cites NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U.S. 118 (1966),
DIGged by a 5-4 vote.
152. Cf Vermeule, supra note 30, at 82 (discussing how submajoritarian rules,
such as the Rule of Four, "counteract ... the ability of majorities to exploit various
low-visibility techniques for disposing of cases in unprincipled ways" (emphasis
added)).
153. Id. at 90 (acknowledging that the "'intervening factors' [exception] is
vague," and can be applied in inconsistent and varied ways, but concluding that "the
general picture is that strong normative rules dampen the potential instability of the
submajoritarian agenda rule; marginal fluctuations in the rules or norms should not
impress us too much").
154. STERN ET AL., supra note 30, at 329-32.
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question accepted for review without reaching a threshold question not
presented in the petition"; a "hitherto unsuspected jurisdictional defect"
becomes apparent; or that an intervening court decision or change in a
statute eliminates the issue or makes it unlikely that it "will arise again,
at least in the same context."1 55 All of these reasons can more or less be
labeled as changed circumstances, especially if the latter phrase is
defined to include facts that did exist at the time certiorari was granted,
but only came to the Court's attention afterwards through briefing, oral
argument, or otherwise. Significantly, what does not appear on the list
is a majority of the Court (whether under a Rule of Six or Rule of Five)
simply disagreeing with the original decision to grant certiorari. This is
the position of Justice Frankfurter and, some charge, of other Justices
at least in some instances. That position has found no defenders in the
scholarly literature because it smacks of political expediency. James
Blumstein has argued that the DIG power should be constrained by an
"evolving common law of certiorari dismissals," given the
"institutional decision of the Court" to grant review. 5 6 Again, it
appears that the Court itself agrees with this norm, with the evidence
being the reasons often proffered by the Court when it DIGs. Indeed, as
we have suggested, even those Justices who we label as advancing the
mere disagreement rationale did so in a somewhat constrained way.57
Still, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish acceptable from
unacceptable reasons. Consider again the Uplinger case. There, the
majority expressly stated that the case was being DIGged "after full
briefing and oral argument," because the opinion being reviewed was
susceptible of differing interpretations regarding how squarely it
presented the federal constitutional issue.1 58 But the differing readings
of the opinion below could have been made at the time certiorari was
granted. Perhaps the five Justices who DIGged only reached that
conclusion after certiorari was granted. Even so, it is a stretch to label
the reasons offered by the majority as changed circumstances. It comes
close to the majority simply disagreeing with the decision of four
Justices to grant certiorari, a point made more candidly, if obliquely,
by Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in the same case.'59 Consider,
155. Id.
156. Blumstein, supra note 30, at 929.
157. See supra notes 92-103, 123-29 and accompanying text (summarizing the
positions of Justices Frankfurter and Stevens in Ferguson and Uplinger, respectively).
158. New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246, 248-49 (1984) (per curiam).
159. Id. at 249-51. As we already observed, supra note 120 and accompanying
text, the majority also pointed to an event after the granting of certiorari-the filing of
an amicus brief by the attorney general of New York-arguing that the statute was
unconstitutional. This placed the Court (and, indeed, the elected officials in New York)
in the embarrassing position of possibly upholding a state statute that the highest legal
2005:1421 1451
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too, Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Nike. He advanced several
reasons in support of the DIG in that case, ° but all of them could have
been apparent at the time certiorari was granted. Perhaps the reasons
came into sharper focus after briefing on the merits, augmented by oral
argument. That is consistent with the norm that most DIGs take place
after briefing and oral argument; but again, the requirement of
"changed circumstances" is a broad one if it includes the changing of
the perception of the characteristics of the case by a majority of the
Justices. Our point is not that such a broad definition is illegitimate,
only that it illustrates the fine line between requiring changed
circumstances, and the disfavored position of a majority of the Justices
simply disagreeing with a decision to grant certiorari.' 6
C. Giving Official Reasons
The development of norms of justification for DIGs would seem to
be closely related to the official pronouncement of those reasons.
Judges giving reasons for decisions is a central feature of American
jurisprudence because, in theory, it cabins the breadth of judicial
power.'62 If the Justices were truly developing a common law of
justifications for DIGs, it would be odd to shield those reasons from the
legal community. Yet that is what the Court often does. The majority
gives an explanation for DIGs in slightly less than half of the cases, a
figure that rises to about fifty-five percent if we include those cases
officer in the executive branch of that state argued was unconstitutional. This is a
changed circumstance, but not much of one; the views of the attorney general could,
and perhaps should, have been apparent before certiorari was granted. The majority
relegated the point to a footnote. Uplinger, 467 U.S. at 246 n. 1.
160. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 658-63 (2003) (per curiam); see also
supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
161. In many of these circumstances, some or all the Justices who voted to
grant certiorari, by dissenting from the DIG, registered their disagreement with the
conclusion that there were changed circumstances sufficient to justify the DIG. For that
reason, Revesz and Karlan argue that "[c]hanged circumstances should be cognizable
only if they convince at least one Justice who originally voted to grant certiorari that his
earlier decision is no longer appropriate." Revesz & Karlan, supra note 4, at 1093.
This obviously endorses a strict Rule of Six for DIGs.
162. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Role of Reason in the Rule of Law, 56 U.
CHI. L. REv. 779, 798 (1989) ("Nothing in the Constitution requires the written
justification of judicial decisions, but a judiciary accountable to reason cannot resort to
arbitrary acts."). Another reason for the Court to give reasons for DIGging a case is
that, otherwise, counsel in that case, and perhaps related litigation, are left in the dark
as to the correct resolution of the issue before the Court. See, e.g., Paul L. Caron, The
Role of State Court Decisions in Federal Tax Litigation: Bosch, Erie, and Beyond, 71
OR. L. REv. 781, 842 n.290 (1992) (commenting on uncertainties left in the wake of
the unexplained DIGged case of White v. United States, 493 U.S. 5 (1989)).
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when at least one Justice addresses the propriety of the DIG in a
separate opinion."' Why do the Justices not offer explanations for all
such cases?
One reason may be that a DIG is the functional equivalent of a
denial of certiorari, 164 and the Court has with relatively few exceptions
had a practice of not giving explanations for the denial. 165 The Court
has frequently reiterated that the denial of certiorari expresses no view
on the merits of the decision from which review is sought."6 Yet there
are several reasons why DIGs are different from denials of certiorari.
Start with the numbers. There are usually but two or three DIGs a
Term, as compared to the thousands of certiorari denials. The
inconvenience of composing an explanation for the former is dwarfed
by the burdens of preparing explanations for the latter. Unlike the
latter, a DIG is preceded by a grant of certiorari. An explanation for
the change, however brief, suggests that the Court (that is, the Justices
who wish to DIG) is attending to its institutional responsibilities. 167 This
is especially appropriate at a time when the dockets of the Court are at
historic lows, thus adding jurisprudential weight to actions of the Court
placing cases on its agenda.
Another reason to explain DIGs is to differentiate that action from
the closely related decision to dismiss a case after certiorari is granted
for lack of jurisdiction."'6 The latter decisions are often accompanied by
an explanation, 69 and rightly so. The distinction is not a mere
formality. It might indicate how a case can properly be placed on the
Court's agenda. More importantly, an explanation for a dismissal
suggests that the Court is not "discharging its responsibilities in a
163. See supra Part II.C.1.
164. Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 365 n.1
(1973); Revesz & Karlan, supra note 4, at 1082 n.59.
165. SeeFALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 30, at 1596-1601.
166. Id. (discussing the views of Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, Stevens, and
others).
167. Blumstein, supra note 30, at 925-26. In his wide-ranging critique of the
Judges' Bill, Ed Hartnett argues that it not only granted a great deal of power to the
Court, but that the Court, in various ways, has expansively used that power in a
manner that calls into question the Court's commitment to the rule of law and the
separation of powers. Hartnett, supra note 35, at 1646-48. Without accepting his entire
thesis-he does not discuss the DIG practice-the concerns raised by his analysis would
be ameliorated by the Court's developing and giving principled reasons for the DIG.
Cf id. at 1718-26 (criticizing the certiorari practice in part due to the asserted failure of
the Court to develop principled reasons to exercise that power).
168. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 30, at 1585-88.
169. E.g., Johnson v. California, 541 U.S. 428 (2004) (per curiam). The case
then returned to the Court in another appeal the following Term, however this time
without jurisdictional problems. Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 2410 (2005).
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lawless manner,"' 170 and instead is acting in a "principled manner. ' 17 1
Some cases illustrate disagreement among the Justices over which
device is appropriate in a particular case. 172 Providing explanations for
DIGs will encourage reasoned resolutions of that distinction.
We propose that the Court explain its decision to DIG in all cases.
It can do that in the relatively short, per curiam opinions that it
typically uses to explain DIGs or other similar dismissals. 173 Making
that a regular practice would also have the benefit of making those
instances when a mere majority decides to DIG a case more
comprehensible and justifiable. In the absence of a per curiam opinion,
at least one Justice in the majority should separately explain the
decision to DIG the case.
D. Strategic Behavior and the DIG
In this Part of the Article we have argued that the essentially
unfettered discretion of a majority of the Court to DIG a case ought to
be limited in various ways and that the Court has in part developed and
followed such limits. The similarly unlimited power of the Court to
grant or deny certiorari has also, for that reason, been the subject of
considerable attention by legal scholars and political scientists.' 74 In
particular, scholars have asked whether the certiorari power has been
170. Davis v. Jacobs, 454 U.S. 911, 912 (1981) (opinion of Stevens, J.,
discussing the denial of certiorari).
171. Id. at 919 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Powell, J.,
dissenting).
172. Compare Minnick v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 452 U.S. 105, 126-27 (1981)
(dismissing writ of certiorari for lack of a final judgment from the state court), with id.
at 127 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that the case should be DIGged). Sometimes
the Court identifies jurisdictional problems, but proceeds to DIG the case rather than
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. E.g., Howell v. Mississippi, 125 S. Ct. 856 (2005) (per
curiam) (DIGging the case where the petitioner did not properly present his claim in
federal court as one arising under federal law). Consider, too, the Court's action in
Nike. Recall that one of the reasons Justice Stevens supported the DIG was that, in his
view, there was no appealable judgment, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 658-64
(Stevens, J., concurring) (2003), which would seem to call for a dismissal, not a DIG.
These cases illustrate that the line between dismissals and DIGs is a fine one, another
reason for the Court to issue explanatory opinions when it decides to DIG.
173. It is of interest that the Court has not only partially incorporated the norm
we propose, but usually places such per curiam decisions in the body of the U.S.
Reports, close to the decisions on the merits, rather than buried in the back of each
volume with the reporting of the hundreds of denials of certiorari. The elevating of per
curiam dispositions to some measure of respectability in this way has been traced to
Justice Frankfurter. Hutchinson, supra note 38, at 163.
174. Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judiciai Review, 84 TEX. L. REv. 257,
292-95 (2005) (discussing this literature).
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exercised in a way that is driven by the formal legal considerations
established by the Court itself, that is, whether there is a conflict among
cases on a legal issue presented, or whether the issue is one of national
importance.175 In contrast, a Justice might, either in lieu of or in
addition to those factors, take his or her own ideological predilections
into account when voting to grant or deny certiorari in a particular
case. Thus, a Justice might vote to grant certiorari in order to reverse a
case below that was decided in a direction that runs counter to the
Justice's policy preferences. Or, a Justice might vote to deny certiorari
for the opposite reason, or alternatively because he or she was
predicting how the other Justices would vote on the merits, and would
not want the entire Court to reach the merits of the case. These are
examples of strategic or sophisticated voting, which occurs "when a
voter does not vote for his or her preferred alternative at an early stage
of a voting process in hopes of bringing about a more desirable
outcome at a later stage."176 Can the Court's use of the DIG also be
described as strategic behavior?
To begin answering that question, first consider whether the
antecedent certiorari process has sometimes or often been driven by
strategic considerations. There is a large body of social science
literature on this topic,'77 and a full discussion is unnecessary here.
Some scholars, based on interviews with the Justices and their clerks,
have suggested that while strategic considerations are not totally absent,
the legal factors do largely inform the Justices' decision to grant or
deny certiorari. 78 On the other hand, careful statistical study of
certiorari votes, based on the private papers of several of the Justices,
have often come to the conclusion that strategic voting does take place
on a routine basis,'79  though in conjunction with identifiable
175. See, e.g., PERRY, supra note 2, passim; see also Sup. CT. R. 10 (listing
the Court's established considerations for deciding whether to grant certiorari).
176. Cordray & Cordray, Philosophy of Certiorari, supra note 24, at 411-12
(citing Gregory A. Caldeira et al., Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the
Supreme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549, 550 (1999)); Epstein et al., supra note 43,
at 397 n.8.
177. For helpful overviews and discussion of this literature, see Cordray &
Cordray, Philosophy of Certiorari, supra note 24, at 410-22; Epstein et al., supra note
43, at 399-401; and Timothy R. Johnson et al., Passing and Strategic Voting on the
U.S. Supreme Court, 39 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 349, 352-54 (2005). For a general
discussion of strategic behavior on the Court, see THOMAS H. HAMMOND ET AL.,
STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND POLICY CHOICE ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (2005).
178. PERRY, supra note 2, at 146-66, 198-215.
179. For example, in their 1999 study of such votes from the 1982 Term,
Caldeira and his colleagues found, among other things, that "whether liberal or
conservative, in grants or denials, members of the Court act with an eye to the behavior
of their fellow justices." Caldeira et al., supra note 176, at 570.
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nonstrategic factors (for example, the presence of a conflict of authority
on an issue found in a case subject to review).180
Most of this literature says little or nothing about DIGs. One
exception is the work of H.W. Perry. In his study based on interviews
of Justices and their clerks; Perry concluded that "[u]sually" cases are
DIGged for "mundane, jurisprudential considerations."' 81 On the other
hand, he conceded that the decision to DIG, or not to DIG, can depend
on how "messy" the case is, that is, how embedded the case is with
issues (which may or may not have been apparent when certiorari was
granted), the resolution of which may make it difficult to reach the core
merits."' Ultimately, Perry concluded that, while
[i]ntriguing in theory, the ability to use digging as a strategic
maneuver is, in reality, quite constrained. To use it
strategically, except in a rare instance, would be easily and
quickly observed, and it would completely undercut the
finality of the cert. conference, which would impose
significant costs on all.183
There are some anecdotal accounts of DIGging used for seemingly
strategic purposes. For example, consider the Court's decision in 1955
in Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, IC.184 That case
involved a breach of contract claim against a cemetery that refused
burial to a Native American based on language in the contract limiting
burial privileges to Caucasians.18 5 The Iowa courts enforced the
180. See Sara C. Benesh et al., Aggressive Grants by Affirm-Mided Justices,
30 Am. POL. RES. 219, 219, 231 (2002) (conducting a study of the Vinson and Warren
Courts from the 1946 to 1968 Terms and finding both strategic and nonstrategic factors
at work); Cordray & Cordray, Philosophy of Certiorari, supra note 24, at 391. The
authors assert that a review of the docket books of Justices Brennan and Marshall
during the Rehnquist Court indicate that strategic factors, "while undeniably important,
cannot adequately account for the Justices' voting behavior at the certiorari
stage .... Even Justices closely aligned in decisions on the merits often have
dramatically different voting records on certiorari." Id. (footnote omitted).
181. PERRY, supra note 2, at 106.
182. See id. at 107-08. Perry refers to standing, ripeness, or mootness issues as
some of the primary complicating factors that can result in a "messy" case. Id. at 107.
Perry continues: "The point is that sometimes the Court will dig a case with
jurisprudential problems and other times will go ahead and resolve it on some technical
issue resulting in no real precedential or doctrinal benefit. And in still other instances,
the Court will skip over jurisdictional problems quite cavalierly." Id.
183. Id. at 109.
184. 349 U.S. 70 (1955).
185. Id. at 71; see also Blumstein, supra note 30, at 935-37. For our discussion
of Rice, we draw on STEPHEN L. WASBY ET AL., DESEGREGATION FROM BROWN TO
ALEXANDER 136-37 (1977).
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contract as written, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, and then
affirmed by an equally divided vote. 186 Shortly thereafter, the Court (in
a highly unusual move) granted rehearing and proceeded to DIG the
case by a five-to-three vote.' 87 Justice Frankfurter wrote for the
majority and stated that only after rehearing did the Court realize "into
proper focus" that Iowa had passed a statute during the course of the
litigation that prevented cemeteries (albeit nonretroactively) from
enforcing racially restrictive clauses. 88 While the Rice case was not
moot, the statute's passage made the situation of "isolated
significance," and imposed the risk of an "inconclusive and divisive
disposition of [the] case when time may [have] further illumine[d] or
completely outmode[d] the issues in dispute."189
On one reading, the Court's explanation is a principled one for a
DIG.'9 The Court prudently hesitated to reach a constitutional question
when the State had statutorily cured the alleged error. Moreover, were
the Court to uphold the Iowa court's decision, it might "discourage
such remedial action by possible condonation of this isolated
incident."1 91 A quite different reading of Rice situates the case in the
Court's history. The case was decided shortly after Brown v. Board of
Education,92 and given the uproar generated by that case, the Court
followed an "informal strategy" of using summary dispositions and
other devices to "avoid unnecessary confrontations" with state
governments on racially charged issues.
193 Rice, the argument runs, 9 4
was one of those cases. Under these circumstances, Frankfurter's
rationale was disingenuous. Then and now, the Court often decides
cases that affect only one person or a small group of people.'
95
Likewise, the Court often decides cases where the statute involved has
been amended or repealed in a nonretroactive way. 196 In short, the
186. Rice v. Sioux City Mem'I Park Cemetery, Inc., 347 U.S. 942 (1953)
(granting certiorari), affdper curiam, 348 U.S. 880 (1954).
187. Rice, 349 U.S. at 79-80.
188. Id. at 75-76.
189. Id. at 76-77.
190. See Blumstein, supra note 30, at 936-37 (making this argument).
191. Rice, 349 U.S. at 77.
192. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
193. Del Dickson, State Court Defiance and the Limits of Supreme Court
Authority.: Williams v. Georgia Revisited, 103 YALE L.J. 1423, 1472 (1994).
194. WASBY ET AL., supra note 185, at 137 (making this argument); Dickson,
supra note 193, at 1474 (same).
195. Dickson, supra note 193, at 1474.
196. Id. Similar arguments were advanced more delicately by the dissent from
the DIG in Rice. 349 U.S. at 80 (Black, J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J.,
dissenting). See also supra note 38 (discussing Justice Frankfurter's string cite of prior
DIGged cases in Rice).
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Court was trying to avoid the political heat that it might generate were
it to decide the case on the merits.
Another possible example of a DIG being used strategically comes
from the Burger Court. In Burrell v. McCay,9 7 the Court DIGged a
case that raised the issue of whether any available state administrative
remedies would need to be exhausted before a plaintiff could file a civil
rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.198 The majority did not explain
the DIG, but Justice Stevens justified it in a somewhat cryptic
concurring opinion. In the space of three paragraphs, he variously
stated that the opinion below "correctly state[d] the applicable law";
that at least one Justice who originally voted to grant certiorari had
changed his mind; and that while the issues raised were "important,"
the "state of the law applicable to the facts disclosed by this record[was] sufficiently clear" that a DIG was "a permissible exercise of the
Court's discretionary power."'99 Dissenting from the DIG, Justice
Brennan, pointing out that the majority had not explained its action,
argued that the record and oral argument revealed no special
circumstances that counseled in favor of a DIG.2" He also stated,
somewhat cryptically, that a Justice (who he did not name) had not
voted for certiorari, yet "participate[d] after oral argument in a
dismissal that ... [was] not justified under the governing standard, but
which rather reflect[ed] only the factors that motivated the original vote
to deny [certiorari]. "201 Justice Brennan concluded that this was a
violation of the Rule of Four.
So described, Burrell is a rather unexceptional example of a
DIGged case. But other accounts offer a more colorful description of
the Justices' actions and suggest their possibly strategic character.2 2
The lower court in Burrell held that exhaustion of state administrative
remedies was not required. 23 According to these sources, Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist voted to grant certiorari to
reverse the lower court decision, while Justice White voted to affirm
197. 426 U.S. 471 (1976) (per curiam).
198. Id. at 473 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing
questions raised by the petition for certiorari).
199. Id. at 471-73 (Stevens, J., concurring).
200. Id. at 473-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 474-75.
202. See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985) 598-600 (Del
Dickson ed., 2001) (describing the conference in Burrell based on the Justices' private
papers); BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT 423-25 (1979) (providing a journalistic account of the deliberations in Burrell,
citing no sources).
203. McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357, 365 (4th Cir. 1975).
1458
HeinOnline  -- 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 1458 2005
The Supreme Court and the DIG
the decision.204 At conference, the majority of the entire Court was
apparently prepared to affirm the decision below, with the Justices who
voted to grant certiorari as the dissenters. 25 After further discussion,
Justice Stewart apparently suggested that the case be DIGged, in part
because the case presented a difficult substantive Eighth Amendment
issue in addition to the exhaustion issue.206 Justice Stewart eventually
recruited four other Justices to vote to DIG: Burger, Powell, Rehnquist,
and Blackmun. °7 Justice White, one of the original group of four
certiorari-granters, did not vote to DIG and indeed separately dissented
from that action with the statement that he "would affirm" the decision
below.20 8 Justice Brennan's dissent was apparently referring to Justice
Stewart voting to DIG, at least in the absence of what Brennan thought
were appropriate changed circumstances to overcome the Rule of
Four.2° In other words, Justice Brennan was of the view that, at the
least, all four Justices who voted to grant certiorari had to vote to DIG
the case. Justice Stevens, as he stated, 210 had not voted at the certiorari
stage, since he was not a member of the Court at that time, but
concurred in the DIG, seemingly providing a sixth vote for that
211
action. What discomforted Justice Brennan was that, had all of the
Justices voted on the merits, it seems the decision below would have
been affirmed by a 5-4 vote.21 2 To complete the story, the Court
eventually decided a case on the merits that rejected an exhaustion
requirement in these circumstances.21 3
204. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 202, at 599;
WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 202, at 423.
205. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 202, at 423-24.
206. See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 202, at 599;
WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 202, at 424.
207. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 202, at 600;
WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 202, at 424.
208. Burrell, 426 U.S. at 471 (White, J., dissenting).
209. See id. at 473-75 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 471-72 (Stevens, J., concurring).
211. We qualify our conclusion since Justice Stevens said, in what is labeled as
a concurring opinion, that while he "did not vote to [DIG, he did] not dissent from that
action." Id. at 472.
212. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 202, at 424-25.
213. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982). Only Justice Powell and
Chief Justice Burger dissented. Id. at 519-20 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). Another example suggested by the literature of apparent strategic behavior
in a DIGged case is the previously discussed New York v. Uplinger case. 467 U.S. 246
(1984). Based in part on the private papers of Justice Brennan, two scholars argue that
Brennan, who had voted to deny certiorari, "no doubt fearing that his colleagues would
reverse the lower court's decision" that had struck down a state law that had the effect
of criminalizing certain homosexual conduct, then argued that the case should be
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The most systematic study of the use of the DIG as a strategic
device is by Scott Hendrickson.214 He focused on the cases DIGged
during the sixteen Terms of the Burger Court, compared DIGged cases
to those cases arising under the Court's certiorari jurisdiction decided
on the merits, and examined various factors related to DIGs that would
be considered extraneous to the strictly legal factors referenced in
opinions accompanying DIGged opinions.215 Thus, he considered,
among other things, whether the Court was less likely to DIG as the
number of amicus curiae briefs filed by organized interests increased,
in cases in which the U.S. solicitor general participated as an amicus,
or in cases in which the U.S. government was a party.216 Conversely,
he considered whether the Court was more likely to DIG cases decided
in a conservative direction by the lower court.217 The first three factors
bear on the importance of the case, and the hypothesis was that the
Justices were more likely to reach the merits of important cases, and
more likely to DIG marginal cases.218 The final factor was based on the
premise that the Burger Court, usually described as made up of
generally conservative Justices, would be more likely to DIG a case
where the lower court opinion leaned in the conservative direction, to
leave the holding of that case intact." 9
Hendrickson found statistical support for these four hypotheses,22 °
which seems to lend support to the notion that nonlegal factors
contribute to the decision to DIG a case.22' Still, as Hendrickson
himself points out, one must be cautious in interpreting these results.222
His database, while impressive, did not include some information that
might support or undermine a strategic explanation for the Court's DIG
behavior. For example, the presence or absence of an intercase or
intercourt conflict in the DIGged cases was unavailable; 223 this
information might be helpful in evaluating the Court's behavior, as the
DIGged, "because he thought it would produce the best possible outcome, given his
distaste for the law." EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 146, at 119-20.
214. Hendrickson, supra note 29.
215. See id. at 13-14 (outlining data and methodology).
216. Seeid. at 11.
217. Id. at 12.
218. Id. at 10-11.
219. See id. at 12-15; supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
220. Hendrickson, supra note 29, at 14-15. Only the difference between
DIGged and non-DIGged cases on the participation of a solicitor general as amicus was
found not to be statistically significant. Id. at 14.
221. Id. at 18.
222. Id.
223. Id. Intercase or intercourt conflict occurs where a case presents a conflict
between two or more federal courts, between a federal and state court, or with prior
Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 12 n. 18.
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Court might be less willing to DIG a case where such a conflict
existed.224 Also, he did not take into account, aside from the filing of
amicus briefs, the possible influence of other political actors.225 An
example would be the ideological direction of Congress at the time the
case was DIGged. 22 6 A policy-oriented Court, wishing to protect its
decisions from reversal, might be more likely to grant certiorari in
cases raising constitutional issues (where congressional reversal is
almost impossible) when the Court and Congress differ in ideological
direction. Conversely, the Court might be more likely to grant review
of cases raising federal statutory issues where congressional reversal is
possible, when the ideological direction of the Court and Congress are
similar.227 On this model it would seem to follow that the Court would
be more likely to DIG cases that, if resolved on the merits, are
candidates to be reversed by Congress. Finally, Hendrickson points out
that the Court has other devices to dispose of cases after certiorari is
granted.228 Such other means could include dismissals for lack of
jurisdiction, or resolving a case on standing or similar jurisprudential
grounds that preclude reaching the merits of a case. 229 A comprehensive
examination of these other devices would be necessary to understand
the institutional environment in which the DIG operates. 230
While covering only one of the three Courts that we examined in
our study, Hendrickson's analysis is valuable and must inform any
treatment of the DIG.231 Subject to appropriate caveats, he concludes
that the DIG has been used, in part, in a strategic way by the Court.232
Our stance is more equivocal, and for several reasons we do not think
224. Id.
225. Id. at 11, 18.
226. Id. at 18.
227. For a more complete examination of this thesis, together with supportive
evidence, see Epstein et al., supra note 43. Professor Epstein and her colleagues do not
expressly discuss the DIG device, instead focusing on the granting of certiorari. 1d. at
395. Also valuable on the strategic interaction of the Court and Congress, especially in
statutory cases, is Lawrence Baum & Lori Hausegger, The Supreme Court and
Congress: Reconsidering the Relationship, in MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW: AN
INTERBRANCH PERSPECTIVE 107 (Mark C. Miller & Jeb Barnes eds., 2004). The
authors point out some of the potential weaknesses of this model, including the
assumptions that both the Court and Congress invariably act in ideological ways, that
Congress is highly cognizant of Supreme Court decisions, or that the Court would
never welcome a congressional response. Id. at 112-16. Professors Baum and
Hausegger do not discuss the DIG.
228. Hendrickson, supra note 29, at 19 n.28.
229. Id.
230. See id. at 18-19.
231. See id. at 18.
232. Id.
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the DIG has been used in an aggressively strategic manner. First, on
the average, DIGs have only been used about two or three times each
Term in the past half-century. If a majority of the Court at any period
were patently result-oriented, we might expect the Court to simply
abandon the norm of the Rule of Four or, failing that, to use the DIG
far more often in its Rule of Five incarnation. Similarly, while the
majority only offered explanations in about one-half of the DIGged
cases (more if we include concurring or dissenting opinions in those
cases), we might expect far fewer, or no, explanations, under a
strategic model. A DIG is the functional equivalent of a denial of
certiorari, and the Court rarely explains those.
On the other hand, our data are at least suggestive of strategic
behavior in one interesting context-agenda setting by the Court. By
agenda setting we refer to the issue of whether the Court collectively,
or Justices individually, are trying to "time" when to decide a case on
the merits by DIGging the case at an earlier time, the Justices may be
expecting to decide the case at a later, more appropriate time.
With regard to agenda setting, we looked at whether the issue
raised by the DIGged case returned to the Court's docket. Of the 155
cases, by our measure the issue presented in sixty-six cases, or forty-
three percent, returned to the Court's docket in separate litigation to be
decided on the merits. In the abstract, we are unable to say whether this
is a high or low percentage. First, recall that we only determined those
issues that returned in cases to the Court's docket. We did not examine
those issues that perhaps became moot or were otherwise resolved by
statutory amendment or some other means, or remain percolating in the
lower courts to the present day.'33 Given the Court's relatively modest
docket-even in the heyday of the Warren and Burger Courts-virtually
any case in which certiorari is granted can be said to raise issues
important in some way to the legal community. Accordingly, one might
expect many such issues to come back to the Court in some fashion.23 4
Indeed, the fact that the Court granted certiorari to a previous case
233. For an example of the latter, see McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820, 828 &
n.5 (3d Cir. 2003) (pointing out that the Supreme Court has dismissed two cases that
raised the issue of whether parental liberty interests under the Due Process Clause
"extend to the companionship of independent adult children" (citing O'Dell v.
Espinoza, 456 U.S. 430 (1982) (per curiam); Jones v. Hildebrant, 432 U.S. 183 (1977)
(per curiam))), and Issac J. K. Adams, Note, Growing Pains: The Scope of Substantive
Due Process Rights of Parents of Adult Children, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1883, 1902 &
n.137 (2004) (same). Espinoza was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Espinoza, 456
U.S. at 430. Jones was DIGged. Jones, 432 U.S. at 189.
234. See Stevens, supra note 31, at 19 & n.73 ("[S]ignificant issues decided in
[cases where only four Justices vote to grant certiorari] might well have come before
the Court in other litigation in due course. The frequency with which an issue arises, of
course, is one measure of its significance.").
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raising the same issue might suggest that, other things being equal, the
Court would remain interested in considering the issue on the merits.
Likewise, the granting of certiorari and subsequent decision to DIG a
case, would be unlikely to go unnoticed in the legal community.235
Lawyers in cases raising the same or similar issues might be
emboldened to push the cases to and through the appellate process, and
perhaps seek certiorari more often than in cases that did not involve a
DIG. To put the same point another way: while the Court does not
solicit cases, the types of cases it does hear (and their holdings) can
serve as a signal to lawyers that it is disproportionately receptive to
hearing certain categories of cases.236 The Court DIGging a case, it
would seem, would serve a similar purpose-suggesting that the Court
is interested in reviewing an issue, even if the particular DIGged case
was ultimately not considered an appropriate vehicle to then reach the
merits of that issue.
Finally, we looked at the time lag between the date a case is
DIGged and the date a subsequent case reaches the Court on the same
issue as evidence of possible strategic behavior by the Court. With our
cases, the average time lag to the second decision was six years. 7
More interesting, however, is how this time lag decreases over time
during the period under study. Figure 2 depicts on the horizontal axis
the year in which the Court DIGged each of the sixty-six cases that it
went on to revisit, while the vertical axis represents the number of
years it took for that one issue to be revisited by the Court.
Figure 2. Number of Years Before Revisiting DIGged Issue




1958 1961 1961 1965 1966 195 5 9 19701972 1977 1978 198 197 1991 19 2001 20,
Year Cam DIGged
235. Revesz & Karlan, supra note 4, at 1105-06.
236. See generally Vanessa A. Baird, The Effect of Politically Salient
Decisions on the US. Supreme Court's Agenda, 66 J. POL. 755 (2004) (developing this
model and providing supporting evidence for it from the 1953 through 2000 Terms of
the Court).
237. This compares favorably with Baird's study, which found a time lag of
about five years between the Court deciding certain types of cases and further litigation
in that subject area reaching the Court. Id. at 761-62.
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As Figure 2 illustrates, the average number of years that it takes the
Court to revisit a DIGged issue has declined from 9.19 years between
1954 and 1969 to about two years since 1992. Thus, while it took an
average of close to ten years during the Warren Court for the same
issue to resurface in litigation before the Court, during the last thirteen
years of the Rehnquist Court it has taken less than two years for
DIGged issues to make their way back to the Court.238
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the somewhat increased attention the Supreme Court has
received in the last few years, particularly since its highly publicized
intervention in the 2000 presidential election, the Court remains, by and
large, a rather secluded and sheltered public institution. Perhaps due to
that aura of secrecy, some of the procedures that the Court frequently
uses have remained outside the full purview of legal scholars. In this
Article we have attempted to shed some light onto a procedure with a
long-standing practice in Court history, yet one about which we know
very little-the practice of dismissing a writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted.
Our focus has been on providing both a discussion of the
jurisprudential issues surrounding the use of the DIG, as well as
presenting and analyzing data regarding the actual practice of the
Court's experience with the DIG. We believe that our results provide
some useful insights regarding the use of the DIG and inform some of
the interesting jurisprudential issues regarding the use of the DIG that
other scholars have previously raised.
Regarding the former, we found that across the three Courts we
studied, the DIG was used as a "conservative" procedural instrument.
The DIG was more likely to be used in constitutional cases, as
compared to other cases, perhaps allowing the Court to avoid more
difficult cases until future occasions. With respect to the jurisprudential
issues, we discussed the propriety of the DIG, and in particular, the
238. There are a number of possible explanations for the trend identified in
Figure 2. Perhaps the Supreme Court bar, and the interest groups that promote and
support litigation at the Court, have become much more efficient in guiding cases
through the lower levels of litigation so as to have an abundant supply of cases ready
for review whenever needed. Perhaps the trend is partially explained by the rise, in the
same period, of the number of certiorari petitions. A larger number of petitions may
make it more likely that any issue will reappear on the Court's agenda. Similarly,
certain types of issues may be more frequently litigated, irrespective of their being
DIGged. The evidence, however, is also consistent with the agenda-setting behavior of
the Court itself. A full exploration of these factors is beyond the scope of the present
Article.
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number of votes required to DIG a case and whether an explanation
should be given when DIGging a case. In both instances, we argued
that there are currently strong norms in the Court in favor of
"supermajority" requirements and providing explanations when
DIGging a case, and that sound policy reasons supported the existence
of those norms.
Several further avenues of research are suggested by our study.
Some examples would be a greater exploration in particular instances of
why cases were, or were not, DIGged; an investigation of the stance
and votes of particular Justices in DIGged cases, and how that might
relate to a Justice's vote on the merits (in a non-DIGged case) or to the
stance of the other Justices at that particular time; how and when DIGs
lead to the same issues returning to the Court in subsequent litigation;
the impact of the filing of amicus briefs in DIGged cases; and how
DIGs compare to similar mechanisms used by the Court that have the
effect of blocking or limiting resolution of a case on the merits, such as
dismissals for lack of jurisdiction or summary affirmances of direct
appeals from U.S. District Courts.239 Exploring these and other
questions can shed further light on the Court's use of the DIG.
239. Cf JEFFREY A. SEGAL ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN
LEGAL SYSTEM 279 tbl. 11.1 (2005) (listing the nonmeritorious resolution of orally
argued cases in the 1953-2003 Terms, including DIGs and dismissals for lack of
jurisdiction).
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APPENDIX I
List of DIGged Cases and Selected Variables
Name Cite Type of Case Discussion Vote Issue Revisited in
Const./Other on DIG Later Case
(Name and Cite)
California ex 348 U.S. Const. No 8-0




Rice v. Sioux 349 U.S. Const. Majority & 5-3
City Mem'l 70 (1955) Dissent
Park Cemetery
Ellis v. Dixon 349 U.S. Const. Majority & 5-4
458 (1955) Dissent
Reeves v. 355 U.S. Const. No 8-1
Alabama 368 (1958) explanation
Wilson v. 355 U.S. Const. Majority 8-1 Swain v. Alabama,
Loew's, Inc. 597 (1958) 380 U.S. 202
(1965)
Triplett v. Iowa 357 U.S. Const. No 9-0 Beilan v. Bd. of
217 (1958) explanation Pub. Educ., 357
U.S. 399 (1958)
Hinkle v. New 358 U.S. Other No 9-0 Dunaway v. New
England Mut. 65 (1958) explanation York, 442 U.S.
Life Ins. Co. 200 (1979)
Joseph v. 359 U.S. Const. No 9-0
Indiana 117 (1959) explanation
Monrosa v. 359 U.S. Other Majority 5-4 M/S Bremen &
Carbon Black 180 (1959) Unterweser v.
Export, Inc. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 407 U.S. 1(1972)
Mitchell v. Or. 361 U.S. Other Majority 8-0
Frozen Foods 231 (1960)
Co.
McGann v. 362 U.S. Other Majority 9-0
United States 214 (1960) 1
Phillips v. New 362 U.S. Const. Majority 9-0
York 456 (1960)
Needelman v. 362 U.S. Const. Majority 6-3
United States 600 (1960)
Kimbrough v. 364 U.S. Other Majority 9-0
United States 661 (1961)
Hooper v. 364 U.S. Const. No 9-0 Smith v. Bennett,
Bennett 807 (1961) explanation 365 U.S. 708
(1961)
Bullock v. 365 U.S. Const. Majority 9-0 Jackson v. Denno,
South Carolina 292 (1961) 378 U.S. 368
____ __ 
_ ____(1964)
Newsom v. 365 U.S. Const. Majority & 6-1 Douglas v.
Smyth 604 (1961) Dissent California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963)
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Name Cite Type of Case Discussion Vote Issue Revisited in
Const./Other on DIG Later Case
(Name and Cite)
Smith v. Butler 366 U.S. Other Majority & 5-4 Atchison, Topeka
161 (1961) Dissent & Santa Fe Ry. v.
Buell, 480 U.S.
557 (1987)
Atchley v. 366 U.S. Const. Majority 9-0 Procunier v.
California 207 (1961) Atchley, 400 U.S.
446 (1971)




Baldonado v. 366 U.S. Const. Majority 9-0
California 417 (1961)
Hodges v. 368 U.S. Other Majority 6-3
United States 139 (1961)
Benz v. N.Y. 369 U.S. Const. Majority 7-1
State Thruway 147 (1962)
Auth.
In re Zipkin 369 U.S. No 6-2
400 (1962) explanation
Rudolph v. 370 U.S. Other Majority 5-2
United States 269 (1962)
Williams v. 371 U.S. Const. Majority 7-2
Zuckert 531 (1963)
Wolf v. 372 U.S. Other Majority 7-2
Weinstein 633 (1963)
Smith v. 373 U.S. Const. Majority 9-0 Haynes v.
Mississippi 238 (1963) Washington, 373
U.S. 503 (1963)
Gotthilf v. Sills 375 U.S. Const. Majority 6-3
79 (1963)
Diamond v. 376 U.S. Const. No 9-0
Louisiana 201 (1964) explanation
Dresner v. 378 U.S. Const. Majority 9-0
Tallahassee 539 (1964)
Bhd. of Ry. & 379 U.S. Other No 7-0
S.S. Clerks v. 26 (1964) explanation
United Air
Lines, Inc.
Jankovich v. 379 U.S. Const. Majority 7-2
Ind. Toll Rd. 487 (1965)
Comm'n
Hughes Tool 380 U.S. Other No 9-0 Hughes Tool Co.
Co. v. Trans 248 (1965) explanation v. Trans World
World Airlines, Airlines, Inc., 409
Inc. U.S. 363 (1973)
Hughes Tool 380 U.S. Other No 9-0 Hughes Tool Co.
Co. v. Trans 249 (1965) explanation v. Trans World
World Airlines, Airlines, Inc., 409
Inc. U.S. 363 (1973)
Susser v. 381 U.S. Other No 8-0 Jefferson Parish
Carvel Corp. 125 (1965) explanation Hosp. Dist. No. 2
v. Hyde, 466 U.S.
2 (1984)
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Name Cite Type of Case Discussion Vote Issue Revisited in
Const./Other on DIG Later Case
(Name and Cite)
Hicks v. 383 U.S. Const. Concurrence 8-1 Kolender v.
District of 252 (1966) Lawson, 461 U.S.
Columbia 352 (1983)
Mishkin v. 383 U.S. Const. Majority 6-3 Roaden v.
New York 502 (1966) Kentucky, 413
U.S. 496 (1973)
Holt v. 384 U.S. Other No 4-1
Alleghany 28 (1966) explanation
Corp.
NAACP v. 384 U.S. Const. No 5-4 NAACP v.
Overstreet 118 (1966) explanation Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458
U.S. 886 (1982)
Cichos v. 385 U.S. Const. Majority 6-3 Benton v.
Indiana 76 (1966) Maryland, 395
U.S. 784 (1969)
Heider v. 385 U.S. Other No 9-0
Mich. Sugar 362 (1967) explanation
Co.
Whims v. 385 U.S. Const. Majority 9-0 Jones v. Georgia,
Georgia 545 (1967) 389 U.S. 24 (1967)
Turner v. New 386 U.S. Const. No 7-0 Eaton v. City of
York 773 (1967) explanation Tulsa, 415 U.S.
697 (1974)
Gilbert v. 388 U.S. Const. Majority 8-1 Katz v. United
California 263 (1967) States, 389 U.S.
347 (1987)
Umans v. 389 U.S. Other No 8-0
United States 80 (1967) explanation
Whitney v. 389 U.S. Const. Dissent 7-2
Florida 138 (1967)
Massachusetts 389 U.S. Const. Majority 6-3 Illinois v. Gates,
v. Painten 560 (1968) 462 U.S. 213
(1983)
Johnson v. 390 U.S. Const. Majority 6-3 Greewald v.
Massachusetts 511 (1968) Wisconsin, 390
U.S. 519 (1968)
Hanner v. 390 U.S. Const. Dissent 5-4
DeMarcus 736 (1968)
Wainwright v. 392 U.S. Const. Concurrence 7-1
New Orleans 598 (1968)
Miller v. 392 U.S. Const. Dissent 5-4 Milton v.
California 616 (1968) Wainwright, 407
U.S. 371 (1972)
Palmieri v. 393 U.S. Const. Majority 9-0 Hayes v. Florida,
Florida 218 (1968) 470 U.S. 811
(1985)
Stiles v. United 393 U.S. No 9-0
States 219 (1968) explanation
Skinner v. 393 U.S. Const. No 6-3 Morris v. Slappy,
Louisiana 473 (1969) explanation 1 461 U.S. 1 (1983)
Perez v. 395 U.S. Const. No 7-0
California 208 (1969) explanation
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Name Cite Type of Case Discussion Vote Issue Revisited in
Const./Other on DIG Later Case
(Name and Cite)
DeBacker v. 396 U.S. Const. Majority & 6-2 McKeiver v.
Brainard 28 (1969) Dissent Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528 (1971)
Conway v. Cal. 396 U.S. Const. Majority 8-0 Ohio Adult Parole
Adult Auth. 107 (1969) Auth. v. Woodard,
523 U.S. 272
(1998)
Jones v. State 397 U.S. Const. Majority 6-2 Papish v. Bd. of
Bd. of Educ. 31 (1970) Curators, 410 U.S.
667 (1973)
Taggart v. 397 U.S. Const. Majority 6-2 Sears Roebuck &





Hester v. 397 U.S. Const. No 5-3
Illinois 660 (1970) explanation
Monks v. New 398 U.S. Const. Majority 6-2
Jersey 71(1970)
Moon v. 398 U.S. Const. Majority 5-2
Maryland 319 (1970)
Odom v. 400 U.S. Const. Majority & 8-1 Michigan v. Payne,
United States 23 (1970) Dissent 412 U.S. 47 (1973)
Bruno v. 400 U.S. Const. No 9-0
Pennsylvania 350 (1971) explanation
Piccirillo v. 400 U.S. Const. Majority & 5-4 Kastigar v. United
New York 548 (1971) Dissent States, 406 U.S.
441 (1972)
Johnson v. 401 U.S. Const. No 6-2
United States 846 (1971) explanation
Triangle 402 U.S. Other Concurrence 5-4
Improvement 497 (1971) & Dissent
Council v.
Ritchie
Bostic v. 402 U.S. Other Majority 9-0
United States 547 (1971)
Romontio v. 402 U.S. Other No 9-0
United States 903 (1971) explanation
McClanahan v. 404 U.S. Other Majority & 6-1
Morauer & 16 (1971) Dissent
Hartzell, Inc.
Duncan v. 405 U.S. Const. Majority & 6-3 Illinois v.
Tennessee 127 (1972) Dissent Somerville, 410
U.S. 458 (1973)
Iowa Beef 405 U.S. Other Majority & 8-1 Barrentine v. Ark.-
Packers, Inc. v. 228 (1972) Dissent Best Freight Sys.,
Thompson 450 U.S. 728
(1981)
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Name Cite Type of Case Discussion Vote Issue Revisited in
Const./Other on DIG Later Case
(Name and Cite)
Murel v. Bait. 407 U.S. Const. Majority 8-1 Addington v.
City Criminal 355 (1972) Texas, 441 U.S.
Court 418 (1979)
Tacon v. 410 U.S. Const. Majority 6-3
Arizona 351 (1973)
Morris v. 410 U.S. Other Majority & 8-1
Weinberger 422 (1973) Dissent
Holder v. 417 U.S. No 8-0
Banks 187 (1974) explanation
United States v. 418 U.S. Other Majority 8-0
Nixon 683 (1974)
Roe v. Doe 420 U.S. Const. No 9-0
307 (1975) explanation
United States v. 420 U.S. Const. No 8-0
Guana-Sanchez 513 (1975) explanation
Cassius v. 420 U.S. Const. No 6-2
Arizona 514 (1975) explanationQuinn v. 425 U.S. Const. Majority 8-0 Kelly v. Johnson,
Muscare 560 (1976) 425 U.S. 238
(1976)
Drew Mun. 425 U.S. Const. No 9-0
Separate Sch. 559 (1976) explanation
Dist. v.
Andrews
Burrell v. 426 U.S. Other Concurrence 6-3 Patsy v. Fla. Bd.
McCray 471 (1976) & Dissent of Regents, 457
U.S. 496 (1982)
Belcher v. 429 U.S. Other Majority & 9-0
Stengel 118 (1976) Concurrence
Cook v. 429 U.S. Const. Majority 9-0
Hudson 165 (1976)
Maness v. 430 U.S. Const. No 9-0
Wainwright 550 (1977) explanation
Darden v. 430 U.S. Const. No 7-2 Darden v.
Florida 704 (1977) explanation Wainwright, 477U.S. 168 (1986)
Jones v. 432 U.S. Other Majority & 6-3
Hildebrant 183 (1977) Dissent
Bankers Trust 435 U.S. Other Majority 8-0 Rubin v. United
Co. v. Mallis 381 (1978) States, 449 U.S.
424 (1981)
N.Y. State 435 U.S. Const. No 7-2 Greenholtz v.
Parole Bd. v. 912 (1978) explanation Inmates of Neb.
Coralluzzo Penal & Corr.
Complex, 442 U.S.1 (1979)
United States v. 436 U.S. Other No 9-0
Jacob 31 (1978) explanation
McAdams v. 438 U.S. Const. No 9-0 Davis v. Passman,
McSurely 189 (1978) explanation 442 U.S. 228
(1979)
Hunter v. Dean 439 U.S. Const. No 9-0 Bearden v.
281 (1978) explanation Georgia, 461 U.S.
III_ 
_ I 660 (1983)
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Name Cite Type of Case Discussion Vote Issue Revisited in
Const./Other on DIG Later Case
(Name and Cite)
Ramsey v. 440 U.S. Const. Majority 9-0
New York 444 (1979)
Estes v. Metro. 444 U.S. Const. Dissent 5-3
Branches of 437 (1980)
Dallas NAACP
Montgomery v. 444 U.S. Other No 9-0 Griggs v. Provident
Century 987 (1979) explanation Consumer Discount
Laminating, Co., 459 U.S. 56
Ltd. (1982)
Massachusetts 445 U.S. Const. No 9-0
v. Meehan 39 (1980) explanation
Walter v. 447 U.S. Const. Majority 5-4
United States 649 (1980)
Kissinger v. 452 U.S. Const. No 8-0
Halperin 713 (1981) explanation






Consol. 455 U.S. Other No 7-1
Freightways 329 (1982) explanation
Corp. v. Kassel
Zipes v. Trans 455 U.S. Other Majority 8-0
World Airlines, 385 (1982)
Inc.
Finley v. 456 U.S. Other No 9-0
Murray 604 (1982) explanation
Poythress v. 459 U.S. Const. No 9-0
Duncan 1012 explanation
(1982)
Eicke v. Eicke 459 U.S. Const. No 9-0
1139 explanation
(1983)
Florida v. 462 U.S. Const. Majority 9-0
Casal 637 (1983)
Roadway 464 U.S. Const. No 9-0
Express, Inc. 988 (1983) explanation
v. Warren
Colo. v. Nunez 465 U.S. Cont. Majority & 9-0
324 (1984) Concurrence
Westinghouse 466 U.S. Other No 9-0 St. Mary's Honor
Elec. Corp. v. 521 (1984) explanation Ctr. v. Hicks, 509
Vaughn U.S. 502 (1993)
New York v. 467 U.S. Const. Majority, 5-4
Uplinger 246 (1984) Concurrence
& Dissent
United States v. 475 U.S. Const. Dissent 7-2
Quinn 791 (1986) I..I
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Name Cite Type of Case Discussion Vote Issue Revisited in
Const./Other on DIG Later Case
(Name and Cite)
EEOC v. Fed. 476 U.S. Other Majority & 7-1 Dep't of Treasury




Cerbone v. 479 U.S. Other No 9-0 Albright v. Oliver,
Conway 84 (1986) explanation 510 U.S. 266
(1994)
Springfield v. 480 U.S. Other Majority & 5-4 City of Canton v.
Kibbe 257 (1987) Dissent Harris, 489 U.S.
378 (1989)
United States v. 480 U.S. Const. No 9-0
Merchant 615 (1987) explanation
Missouri v. 480 U.S. Const. No 9-0 Whren v. United
Blair 698 (1987) explanation States, 517 U.S.
806 (1996)
Lynaugh v. 480 U.S. Const. No 9-0 Lockhart v.
Petty 699 (1987) explanation Fretwell, 506 U.S.
1 364 (1993)
Van Drasek v. 481 U.S. Const. No 9-0 United States v.
Webb 738 (1987) explanation Stanley, 483 U.S.
669 (1987)
California v. 483 U.S. Const. Majority & 6-3 California v.
Rooney 307 (1987) Dissent Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35 (1988)
Vermont v. 484 U.S. Const. No 8-0
Cox 173 (1987) explanation
USPS v. Nat'l 485 U.S. Other No 9-0 E. Ass'n Coal
Ass'n of Letter 680 (1988) explanation Corp. v. UMW,
Carriers 531 U.S. 57 (2000)
Allied Tube & 486 U.S. Other No 7-2
Conduit Corp. 492 (1988) explanation
v. Indian Head,
Inc.
Harbison- 488 U.S. Other No 9-0 St. Mary's Honor
Walker 226 (1988) explanation Ctr. v. Hicks, 509
Refractories v. U.S. 502 (1993)
Brieck
White v. 493 U.S. 5 Other No 8-1
United States (1989) explanation
Parker v. 498 U.S. Const. No 5-4
Dugger 308 (1991) explanation
Ohio v. 498 U.S. Const. No 9-0 Payne v.
Huertas 336 (1991) explanation Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808 (1991)
Gibson v. Fla. 502 U.S. Const. No 9-0
Bar 104 (1991) explanation
PFZ Props., 503 U.S. Other No 9-0
Inc. v. 257 (1992) explanation
Rodriguez
Montana v. 506 U.S. 5 Const. Concurrence 8-1 McKune v. Lile,
Imlay (1992) & Dissent 536 U.S. 24 (2002)
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Name Cite Type of Case Discussion Vote Issue Revisited in
Const./Other on DIG Later Case(Name and Cite)
Hadley v. 506 U.S. Other No 9-0
United States 19 (1992) explanation _
Fex v. 507 U.S. Other No 7-2
Michigan 43 (1993) explanation
Ime I I 0 I TT C D I.
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Name Cite Type of Case Discussion Vote Issue Revisited in
Const./Other on DIG Later Case
(Name and Cite)
Mathias v. 535 U.S. Other Majority 8-0 Verizon Md. Inc.
WorldCom 682 (2002) v. Pub. Serv.
Techs., Inc. Comm'n, 535 U.S.
635 (2002)Ford Motor 537 U.S. 1 Other No 9-0 Exxon Mobil Corp.
Co. v. (2002) explanation v. 'Allapattah
McCauley Servs., Inc.,
125 S. Ct. 2611
(2005)Abdur'Rahman 537 U.S. Other Dissent 8-1 Gonzalez v.
v. Bell 88 (2002) Crosby, 125 S. Ct.
2641 (2005)
Nike, Inc. v. 539 U.S. Const. Concurrence 6-3
Kasky 654 (2003) & Dissent
Howell v. 125 S. Ct. Const. Majority 9-0
Mississippi 856 (2005)




1. In three cases, In re Zipkin, 369 U.S. 400 (1962), Stiles v.
United States, 393 U.S. 219 (1968), and Holder v. Banks, 417 U.S.
187 (1974), the lower court opinion was not published, and other
sources were not available to enable us to characterize the issues in the
case or explore whether the Court revisited those issues in subsequent
cases.
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APPENDIX II
List of Non-DIGged Cases and Selected Variables
Name Cite Type of Case
Constitutional/
Other
Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v.
Holland 346 U.S. 379 (1953) Other
Offutt v. United States 348 U.S. 11 (1954) Other
McAllister v. United States 348 U.S. 19 (1954) Other
Williams v. Georgia 349 U.S. 375 (1955) Constitutional
Gibson v. Lockheed Aircraft Serv., Other
Inc. 350 U.S. 356 (1956)
Schulz v. Pa. R.R. 350 U.S. 523 (1956) Other
Armstrong v. Armstrong 350 U.S. 568 (1956) Constitutional
S. Pac. Co. v. Gileo 351 U.S. 493 (1956) Other
Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. 352 U.S. 500 (1957) Other
Webb v. I11. C. R.R. 352 U.S. 512 (1957) Other
Herdman v. Pa. R.R. 352 U.S. 518 (1957) Other
Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Other
Lines 352 U.S. 521 (1957)
United States v. Ohio Power Co. 353 U.S. 98 (1957) Other
Deen v. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Other
Ry. 353 U.S. 925 (1957)
Thompson v. Tex. & Pac. Ry. 353 U.S. 926 (1957) Other
Arnold v. Panhandle & Santa Fe Other
Ry. 353 U.S. 360 (1957)
Ringhiser v. Chesapeake & Ohio Other
Ry. 354 U.S. 901 (1957)
McBride v. Toledo Terminal R.R. 354 U.S. 517 (1957) Other
Gibson v. Thompson 355 U.S. 18 (1957) Other
Palermo v. Luckenbach S.S. 355 U.S. 20 (1957) Other
Stinson v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. 355 U.S. 62 (1957) Other
Honeycutt v. Wabash Ry. 355 U.S. 424 (1958) Other
Kernan v. Am. Dredging Co. 355 U.S. 426 (1958) Other
Ferguson v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. 356 U.S. 41 (1958) Other
Grimes v. Raymond Concrete Pile Other
Co. 356 U.S. 252 (1958)
Butler v. Whiteman 356 U.S. 271 (1958) Other
Moore v. Terminal R.R. 358 U.S. 31 (1958) Other
Baker v. Tex. & Pac. Ry. 359 U.S. 227 (1959) Other
Magenau v. Aetna Freight Liners, Other
Inc. 360 U.S. 273 (1959)
Harris v. Pa. R.R. 361 U.S. 15 (1959) Other
Connor v. Butler 361 U.S. 29 (1959) Other
Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Other
Shipping 361 U.S. 107 (1959)
Inman v. Bait. & Ohio R.R. 361 U.S. 138 (1959) Other
Davis v. Virginian Ry. 361 U.S. 354 (1960) Other
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Name Cite Type of Case
Constitutional/
OltherArnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc. 361 U.S. 388 (1960) Other
Ward v. At. Coast Line R.R. 362 U.S. 396 (1960) Other
Cory Corp. v. Sauber 363 U.S. 709 (1960) Other
Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Other
Inc. 364 U.S. 325 (1960)
N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Other
v. Henagar 364 U.S. 441 (1960)
Maynard v. Durham & S. Ry. 365 U.S. 160 (1961) Other
NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co. 369 U.S. 404 (1962) Other
Lanza v. New York 370 U.S. 139 (1962) Constitutional
Foman v. Davis 371 U.S. 178 (1962) Other
Willner v. Comm'n on Character &
Fitness 373 U.S. 96 (1963) Constitutional
Mercer v. Theriot 377 U.S. 152 (1964) Other
Henry v. Mississippi 379 U.S. 443 (1965) Constitutional
Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co. 380 U.S. 39 (1965) Constitutional
Dep't of Mental Hygiene v. Constitutional
Kirchner 380 U.S. 194 (1965)
Simons v. Miami Beach First Nat'l Constitutional
Bank 381 U.S. 81 (1965)
Evans v. Newton 382 U.S. 296 (1966) Constitutional
United States v. Adams 383 U.S. 39 (1966) Other
Rosenblatt v. Baer 383 U.S. 75 (1966) Constitutional
Hoffa v. United States 385 U.S. 293 (1966) Constitutional
Osborn v. United States 385 U.S. 323 (1966) Constitutional
Redrup v. New York 386 U.S. 767 (1967) Constitutional
Smith v. Illinois 390 U.S. 129 (1968) Constitutional
Stockholder of Ferry v. Anderson 390 U.S. 414 (1968) Other
Avery v. Midland County 390 U.S. 474 (1968) Constitutional
AFEU v. Logan Valley Plaza 391 U.S. 308 (1968) Constitutional
Bumper v. North Carolina 391 U.S. 543 (1968) Constitutional
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 392 U.S. 409 (1968) Other
Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R. 393 U.S. 156 (1968) Other
United States v. Grace Estate 395 U.S. 316 (1969) Other
Noyd v. Bond 395 U.S. 683 (1969) Other
Benton v. Maryland 395 U.S. 784 (1969) Constitutional
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Other
Inc. 396 U.S. 229 (1969)
NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co. 396 U.S. 258 (1969) Other
Wade v. Wilson 396 U.S. 282 (1970) Constitutional
Czosek v. O'Mara 397 U.S. 25 (1970) Other
Nelson v. Georgia 399 U.S. 224 (1970) Other
Britt v. North Carolina 404 U.S. 226 (1971) Constitutional
Iowa Beef Packers v. Thompson 405 U.S. 228 (1972) Other
United States v. Generes 405 U.S. 93 (1972) Other
Loper v. Beto 405 U.S. 473 (1972) Constitutional
Mancusi v. Stubbs 408 U.S. 204 (1972) Constitutional
Neil v. Biggers 409 U.S. 188 (1972) Constitutional
Gomez v. Perez 409 U.S. 535 (1973) Constitutional
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Constitutional/
Other
Hall v. Cole 412 U.S. 1 (1973) Other
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte 412 U.S. 218 (1973) Constitutional
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo 416 U.S. 637 (1974) Constitutional
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co. 419 U.S. 345 (1974) Constitutional
Fry v. United States 421 U.S. 542 (1975) Constitutional
United States v. Agurs 427 U.S. 97 (1976) Constitutional
Ohio v. Gallagher 425 U.S. 257 (1976) Constitutional
Estelle v. Gamble 429 U.S. 97 (1976) Constitutional
EPA v. Brown 431 U.S. 99 (1977) Other
Miliken v. Bradley 433 U.S. 267 (1977) Constitutional
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Constitutional
Co. 433 U.S. 562 (1977)
Mont. Power Co. v. EPA 434 U.S. 809 (1977) Other
Vt. Nuclear Power Corp. v. Other
NRDCI 435 U.S. 519 (1978)
N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. Beazer 440 U.S. 568 (1979) Constitutional
Bell v. Wolfish 441 U.S. 520 (1979) Constitutional
Costle v. Pac. Legal Found. 445 U.S. 198 (1980) Other
Am. Exp. Lines v. Alvez 446 U.S. 274 (1980) Other
County of Imperial v. Munoz 449 U.S. 54 (1980) Other
Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie 452 U.S. 394 (1981) Other
Dep't of State v. Wash. Post Co. 456 U.S. 595 (1982) Other
Middlesex County v. Garden St. Other
Bar Ass'n 457 U.S. 423 (1982)
Nixon v. Fitzgerald 457 U.S. 731 (1982) Constitutional
Los Angeles v. Lyons 461 U.S. 95 (1983) Constitutional
Local No. 82 v. Crowley 467 U.S. 526 (1984) Other
Martinez v. Bynum 461 U.S. 321 (1983) Constitutional
Michigan v. Clifford 464 U.S. 287 (1984) Constitutional
Pennhurst State v. Halderman 465 U.S. 89 (1984) Constitutional
Escambia County v. McMillan 466 U.S. 48 (1984) Other
Welsh v. Wisconsin 466 U.S. 740 (1984) Constitutional
New Jersey v. T.L.O. 468 U.S. 1214 (1984) Constitutional
Darden v. Wainwright 477 U.S. 168 (1986) Constitutional
United States v. Am. Coll. of
Physicians 475 U.S. 834 (1986) Other
Batson v. Kentucky 476 U.S. 79 (1986) Constitutional
Connecticut v. Barrett 479 U.S. 523 (1987) Constitutional
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca 480 U.S. 421 (1987) Other
Pennsylvania v. Finley 481 U.S. 551 (1987) Constitutional
Philips Petroleum Co. v. Other
Mississippi 484 U.S. 469 (1988)
Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Other
Lynn 487 U.S. 347 (1989)
Neitzke v. Williams 490 U.S. 319 (1989) Other
City of Canton v. Harris 489 U.S. 378 (1989) Other
Dugger v. Adams 489 U.S. 401 (1989) Constitutional
Zant v. Moore 489 U.S. 836 (1989) Constitutional
Cal. State Bd. v. Sierra Summit 490 U.S. 844 (1989) Other
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Constitutional/
Other
New York v. Harris 495 U.S. 14 (1990) Constitutional
U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Triplett 494 U.S. 715 (1990) Other
Stevens v. Dep't of Treasury 500 U.S. 1 (1991) Other
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Other
Inc. 505 U.S. 763 (1992)
United States v. Williams 504 U.S. 36 (1992) Other
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) Constitutional
United States v. Granderson 511 U.S. 39 (1994) Other
Powell v. Nevada 511 U.S. 79 (1994) Constitutional
Missouri v. Jenkins 515 U.S. 70 (1995) Constitutional
Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner 516 U.S. 325 (1996) Constitutional
UFCW Union Local 571 v. Brown Constitutional
Group 517 U.S. 544 (1996)
Blessing v. Freestone 520 U.S. 329 (1997) Other
United States v. LaBonte 520 U.S. 751 (1997) Other
City of Boerne v. Flores 521 U.S. 507 (1997) Constitutional
Knowles v. Iowa 525 U.S. 113 (1998) Constitutional
Haddle v. Garrison 525 U.S. 121 (1998) Other
Bank of Am. v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Other
P'ship 526 U.S. 434 (1999)
Illinois v. McArthur 531 U.S. 326 (2001) Constitutional
Great-West v. Knudson 534 U.S. 204 (2002) Other
Atkins v. Virginia 536 U.S. 304 (2002) Constitutional
Newland v. Saffold 536 U.S. 214 (2002) Other
125 S. Ct. 2108
Tory v. Cochran (2005) Constitutional
Notes:
1. The following twenty-three cases were treated as separated data
points since they involved multiple legal issues (number of legal issues
listed in parentheses): McAllister v. United States (two); Southern
Paciric Co. v. Gileo (two); United States v. Adams (two); Hoffa v.
United States (4); Osborn v. United States (three); Bumper v. North
Carolina (three); Jones v. Alfred H. Meyer Co. (three); Noyd v. Bond
(two); Benton v. Maryland (two); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park Inc.
(three); Wade v. Wilson (two); Nelson v. Georgia (two); Loper v. Beto
(two); Mancusi v. Stubbs (two); Neil v. Biggers (two); Fry v. United
States (two); Estelle v. Gambelle (two); Miliken v. Bradley (three);
New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer (three); Bell v. Wolfish
(two); Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation (two); Department of Labor
v. Triplett (two); and City of Boerne v. Flores (two).
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